Multistakeholder Initiatives in Corporate Social Responsibility: The OECD Guidance and Conflict Minerals by Johns, Matthew
Johns, Matthew (2010) Multistakeholder Initiatives in 
Corporate Social Responsibility: The OECD Guidance 
and Conflict Minerals. [Dissertation (University of 
Nottingham only)] (Unpublished) 
Access from the University of Nottingham repository: 
http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/23847/1/2010_Matthew_Johns.pdf
Copyright and reuse: 
The Nottingham ePrints service makes this work by researchers of the University of 
Nottingham available open access under the following conditions.
· Copyright and all moral rights to the version of the paper presented here belong to 
the individual author(s) and/or other copyright owners.
· To the extent reasonable and practicable the material made available in Nottingham 
ePrints has been checked for eligibility before being made available.
· Copies of full items can be used for personal research or study, educational, or not-
for-profit purposes without prior permission or charge provided that the authors, title 
and full bibliographic details are credited, a hyperlink and/or URL is given for the 
original metadata page and the content is not changed in any way.
· Quotations or similar reproductions must be sufficiently acknowledged.
Please see our full end user licence at: 
http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/end_user_agreement.pdf 
A note on versions: 
The version presented here may differ from the published version or from the version of 
record. If you wish to cite this item you are advised to consult the publisher’s version. Please 
see the repository url above for details on accessing the published version and note that 
access may require a subscription.
For more information, please contact eprints@nottingham.ac.uk
1 
 
 
 
 
 
University of Nottingham 
 
 
 
Multistakeholder Initiatives in Corporate Social Responsibility: The OECD Guidance 
and Conflict Minerals 
 
 
 
Matthew Johns 
 
 
  
MA in Corporate Social Responsibility 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
 
 
Multistakeholder Initiatives in Corporate Social Responsibility: The OECD Guidance 
and Conflict Minerals 
 
 
 
By 
 
 
 
Matthew Johns 
 
 
 
2010 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
$GLVVHUWDWLRQSUHVHQWHGLQSDUWFRQVLGHUDWLRQIRUWKHGHJUHHRI³0$LQ&RUSRUDWH
6RFLDO5HVSRQVLELOLW\´ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 
 
Abstract 
In recent years, war has raged in the Democratic Republic of Congo between various military 
bodies, bringing death and devastation to millions of innocent civilians. The conflict has been 
IXHOOHGE\WKHFRXQWU\¶VDEXQGDQWPLQHUDOZHDOWKZLWKIDFWions exploiting state weakness and 
taking control of a large proportion of the mining sector. One of the largest purchasers of the 
&RQJR¶V PLQHUDOV LV WKH JOREDO HOHFWURQLFV LQGXVWU\ 1*2V DQG FLYLO VRFLHW\ KDYH
subsequently accused electronics companies of indirectly funding armed groups.   
 
This dissertation explores a multi-stakeholder initiative in corporate social responsibility; the 
³2(&' 'XH 'LOLJHQFH *XLGDQFH IRU 5HVSRQVLEOH 6XSSO\ &KDLQ 0DQDJHPHQW RI 0LQHUDOV
from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk ArHDV´ 9DULRXV VRXUFHV RI LQIRUPDWLRQ WDNHQ IURP
international governmental organisations, industry associations, corporations, and non-
governmental organisations were explored. This research was carried out in order to 
understand how the Guidance was developed, how its content stands to address the problems 
in the mineral supply chain, the likelihood of the Guidance being thoroughly implemented, 
and the potential for the Guidance to become institutionalised as an example of best practice 
when sourcing minerals. 
 
This dissertation found that stakeholders were incorporated to varying degrees into the 
development process according to their possession of power, legitimacy, and urgency. This 
multi-stakeholder approach allows monitoring and pressure to be applied on companies from 
different actors, thereby positively impacting the likelihood of corporations adhering to its 
principles. The alignment of an industry management tool according to the Guidance stands 
to further complement implementation efforts. However, the lack of formal sanction for 
transgressors coupled with an inability to accurately verify critical information provided 
could undermine efforts to widely implement and institutionalise due diligence in the mineral 
supply chain. Yet imminent formal legislation in the United States represents a move towards 
µKDUGWUXVWRIFRPSDQLHV¶DQGFRXOGSRWHQWLDOO\SURYLGHWKHLPSHWXVIRULQVWLWXWLRQDOLVDWLRQ 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) 
Gaining independence in 1960, the DRC is currently in the midst of a humanitarian crisis as a 
five-year conflict rages between Congolese government troops, Democratic Liberation Forces 
of Rwanda, rebel group National Congress for the Defense of the People, and other militia 
forces (Enough, 2009, p.2). These groups have contributed to rape, torture, and other human 
rights abuses, with approximately 5 million people losing their lives as a result of the conflict 
(CIA, 2010).  
 
Political cRUUXSWLRQ DQG PLVPDQDJHPHQW )&2  FRXSOHG ZLWK WKH ZDU¶V GHYDVWDWLQJ
impact on national output and government revenue (CIA, 2010) have meant that the DRC 
lack the institutional capacity to effectively govern the country. Foreign investment has been 
traditionally low due to the uncertainty caused by the conflict, the lack of infrastructure, and 
generally poor business environment (ibid7KXVZKLOVWRQHPD\DVVHUWWKDW³WUDGHGDPSHQV
WKH ILUH RI ZDUV´ (Fort and Westermann-Behaylo, 2008, p.56), it appears here that war has 
deterred trade. Real gross domestic product per capita has fallen from US$380 in 1960 to 
US$115 in 2004, and in 2007 the DRC ranked 167th out of 177 countries worldwide in terms 
of human development attainment (FCO, 2010), underlining the desperate poverty of the 
Congolese. 
 
However, the DRC is potentially one of the richest countries in Africa (FCO, 2010), being 
endowed with vast mineral wealth (CIA, 2010). Civil wars are often fuelled by struggles over 
control and access to natural resources (Gleditsch, 1998, p.381). Perhaps the most famous 
H[DPSOHRIWKLVLVµEORRGGLDPRQGV¶ZKLFKGURYHZDULQ6LHUUD/HRQHDQG/LEHULD7RGD\LQ
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WKH '5& ZDUULQJ SDUWLHV DUH VWUXJJOLQJ IRU FRQWURO RYHU µFRQIOLFW PLQHUDOV¶ ZKLFK KDYH
become common materials used in the manufacture of consumer electronics (Schure, 2010). 
Due to the devastating impact of the conflict, these minerals have EHHQUHIHUUHGWRDV³EORRG
GLDPRQGVRIWKHGLJLWDODJH´0DQW]S Corporations who use these materials have 
consequently found themselves under intense pressure from Non-governmental Organisations 
(NGOs) and civil society for indirectly funding armed conflict in the DRC (Murray, 2010).  
 
1.2 The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
,QUHVSRQVHWRJURZLQJLQWHUQDWLRQDOVFUXWLQ\RQWKHFRQIOLFWDQGWKH'5&¶VPLQHUDOSUREOHPV
WKH 2(&' D DUH FXUUHQWO\ SXWWLQJ WKH ILQDO WRXFKHV WR D GUDIW GRFXPHQW WLWOHG ³Due 
Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chain Management of Minerals from Conflict-
Affected and High-5LVN$UHDV´8VHRIWKLV*XLGDQFHFRXOGEULQJWUDQVSDUHQF\WRWKHPLQHUDO
supply chain and KDUQHVV WKH '5&¶V PLQHUDO ZHDOWK WR EULQJ SURVSHULW\ WR LWV SHRSOH The 
2(&'LVDQRUJDQLVDWLRQZKHUH³WKHJRYHUQPHQWVRIFRXQWUies work together to address 
the economic, social and environmental challenges of globalisatLRQ´ 2(&'  S ,W
also provides a setting where governments can compare experiences and co-ordinate 
international policies. The Guidance aims to define and influence corporate practice 
throughout the mineral supply chain to ensure that companies are exercising sufficient due 
diligence regarding their mineral usage.  
 
1.3 Achilles and E-TASC 
This dissertation has been carried out as part of an internship programme with Achilles, a 
procurement organisation which seeks ³to identify, monitor and evaluate suppliers on behalf 
of major organisations worldwide´ (Achilles, 2010). Achilles run a service called 
³Electronics ± Tool for Accountable Supply Chains (E-7$6&´, which is an electronics 
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industry focused web-EDVHG LQIRUPDWLRQ PDQDJHPHQW WRRO IRU FRPSDQLHV ,W  ³LV GHVLJQHG
around a supplier engagement process that aims to establish a uniform approach to 
compliance which focuses on high standards, collaboration and fostering a culture of 
corporate social responsibility (CSR) LQWKHJOREDOHOHFWURQLFVVXSSO\FKDLQ´(-TASC, 2010). 
Currently, buyers invite their suppliers to utilise the tool and complete an online self-
assessment questionnaire (SAQ) which assesses them on four areas: labour, ethics, health and 
safety, and environment. They then obtain a score which is then shared with the customer. 
Customers can use this information as part of the basis for purchasing decisions and monitor 
suppliers for improvements over time. E-TASC was developed in tandem with the Global e-
Sustainability Initiative (GeSI), an industry organisation that aims to encourage sustainable 
development in the electronics sector, and the Electronics Industry Code of Conduct (EICC), 
which aims to improve working and environmental conditions in global electronics supply 
chains. Membership of both these organisations and E-TASC comprises leading electronics 
companies such as Deutsche Telecom, Microsoft, and Motorola. 
 
E-TASC is mentioned in the OECD *XLGDQFH ZLWK D UHFRPPHQGDWLRQ WR ³Hxtend existing 
digital information-sharing systems´ 2(&' D to provide details of corporate 
adherence to the principles set out. Achilles has subsequently sought to update E-TASC and 
align its content with that of the Guidance in order to capitalise on this attempt at industry 
consistency around mineral sourcing. Subsequently the internship entailed project-managing 
E-7$6&¶V update in accordance with the Guidance. This involved liaising between the 
OECD, GeSI, and academics to facilitate clarification and revisions of the draft Guidance. A 
gap analysis was also carried out between the Guidance and E-TASC to identify which 
aspects of the Guidance the tool already covers and which provisions will need to be 
incorporated into the update. Other work with Achilles included research into potential third-
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party verifiers of E-TASC information and working with software developers to understand 
the feasibility of updating the tool according to the OECD document.   
 
1.4 The dissertation 
Using a variety of theoretical, corporate, and political perspectives, this dissertation attempts 
to build on the work carried out during the internship by providing a case study on how 
international CSR guidance is created, how management tools are updated to implement and 
complement them, and how these processes potentially affect the Guidance¶V GLIIXVLRQ DQG
institutionalisation. This will hopefully contribute to existing CSR scholarship in a number of 
ways. The Guidance is solely focused on the electronics industry, and a study of it may help 
to overcome the lack of industry sector studies on CSR codes and practices (Visser, 2008, 
p.493). There has also been minimal work examining the application of codes to suppliers 
and their compliance (Millington, 2008, p.376). As the Guidance aims to influence actors 
throughout the supply chain, this dissertation stands to contribute in that area as well. 
Furthermore, the majority of international standards such as the Guidance do ³not reveal why 
certain gURXSV ZHUH LQYROYHG DQG RWKHUV QRW´ (Fransen and Kolk, 2007, p.676), and an 
examination of the development process of the Guidance could shed light on this often 
neglected issue.  
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CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
The following literature review will begin by outlining the process and effects of 
globalisation and how this has undermined nation-state authority whilst allowing corporations 
to expand their worldwide operations. This will provide the context for outlining the supply 
chain issues that companies face as a result of their transnational activities and a shift towards 
proactive supply chain management. Finally, a comprehensive summary of the literature 
surrounding corporate codes of conduct will be provided. This will subsequently provide the 
foundations upon which the rest of this dissertation which build upon.  
 
2.1 Globalisation and Governance 
)UDQVHQ DQG .RON  S  REVHUYH WKDW ³WKHUH LV D FOHDU WHQGHQF\ WR IRFXV RQ WKH
international nature of CSR, which is understandable since it is in that context that the most 
GLIILFXOW GLOHPPDV KDYH WR EH DGGUHVVHG´ 7KLV Lnclination across the literature can be 
attributed to the emergence of globalisation. Globalisation can be defined as ³WKHSURFHVVRI
intensification of cross-area and cross-border social relations between actors from very 
distant locations, and of growing transnational interdependence of economic and social 
DFWLYLWLHV´ Scherer and Palazzo, 2008, p.415). This has been driven by decreasing 
communication costs, technological development (ibid, p.417) and the liberalisation of global 
trade rules (Dhanarajan, 2005, p.530). Whilst globalisation has facilitated productive 
processes such as the exchange of knowledge and financial transactions between disparate 
locations, it has also contributed to social issues such as pollution, crime, and migration 
transcending national borders (Scherer and Palazzo, 2008, p.415). The local variability of 
these new global problems presents challenges in terms of their prevention and mitigation 
(Rosenau, 2005, p.23). Ultimately, globalisation has led to activities taking place across 
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countries and beyond the control of any single regulatory authority (Scherer et al., 2006, 
p.512). Scholars have consequently questioned the role of nation-states and their ability to 
combat negative externalities associated with globalisation. 
 
Governance is ³UXOH V\VWHPV LQ ZKLFK VWHHULQJ PHFKDQLVPV DUH HPSOR\HG WR IUDPH DQG
implement goals that move communities in the directions they wish to go or that enable them 
to maintain the institutions and policies they wish to maintain´ 5RVHQDX  S
Normally, the act of exercising and delegating governance is associated with national 
governments, with authority located within nation-states (ibid, p.21).  Domestically, 
governments have been traditionally tasked with providing regulation which underpins the 
functioning of the market system (Detomasi, 2007, p.322). This entailed responsibilities such 
as the establishment of property rights, the provision of public goods, and the mitigation of 
externalities (Scherer and Palazzo, 2008). Thus, political authorities are ill-equipped to 
effectively intervene in and govern international issues caused by globalisation. Governments 
have consequently been unable to uphold a high level of regulation (Bondy et al., 2007) to 
adequately oversee the behaviour of companies operating around the world. This dearth of 
effective international regulation has allowed multinational corporations (MNCs) to function 
in a relatively unrestricted manner. 
 
Within the context of globalisation, MNCs have grown in terms of both quantity and 
influence. At the end of the 1960s, there were only approximately 7,000 MNCS, but by 2002 
there were more than 64,000 with over 870,000 subsidiaries (Van Tulder, 2006, p.47). 
Scholars acknowledge that the minimum responsibility of businesses is to obey laws (Scherer 
and Palazzo, 2008), but the lack of state capacity to enact effective regulation, particularly in 
developing countries, has led to negative consequences without any punishment for guilty 
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parties. The liberalisation of global trade rules has increased the power of MNCs (Dhanarajan, 
2005, p.530), and companies have utilised this power to negotiate beneficial investment 
conditions with governments due to their ability to relocate their operations to other countries 
with lower costs and  unrestrictive legal systems (Detomasi, 2007, p.323). This, coupled with 
the growing appreciation of the benefits of foreign direct investment (FDI) (ibid, p.322), has 
led national goverQPHQWV LQWR D ³UDFH WR WKH ERWWRP´ 6FKHUHU DQG 3DOD]]R , p.422), 
whereby governments attract FDI through minimal legislation. States have thus been 
reluctant to implement sustainability regulation for fear of discouraging business activity in 
their domains (Bondy et al., 2007, p.434). Consequently, globalisation has endowed 
corporations with the incentive to influence regulatory regimes to improve their competitive 
position (Detomasi, 2007, p.322), and their growing ability to do so has compromised the 
sovereignty of nation states (Scherer et al., 2006, p.512). This incentive has been exacerbated 
E\WKHPDUNHWV\VWHP¶VHPSKDVLVRQVKRUWWHUPSURILWDELOLW\)RUWDQG:HVWHUPDQQ-Behaylo, 
2008, p.59) which pressures companies to forgo social and environmental concerns in favour 
of monetary considerations. Furthermore, the liberalisation of capital markets has led to an 
increased number of company shareholders, which has made it difficult for larger companies 
to pursue objectives that are non-financial in nature (ibid, p.59). This growth in size, number, 
and power of MNCs, the increased dispersal of stock ownership within companies, and the 
ODFN RI HIIHFWLYH UHJXODWLRQ XQGHUSLQQLQJ WKHLU DFWLYLWLHV KDV OHG FULWLFV WR DUJXH WKDW ³WKH
MNC is accountable to no oQH´ 'HWRPDVL  S 5HVXOWDQWO\ EXVLQHVVHV KDYH
contributed to phenomena such as a widening gap between rich and poor both within and 
between countries (Rosenau, 2005, p.32), environmental degradation (Dhanarajan, 2005, 
p.531), and human rights abuses (Bendell, 2005, p.362). 
Yet globalisation has also contributed to the growth of a global civil society, and from this 
has emerged the µCorporate Accountability Movement¶ (Albareda, 2008, p.432) which has 
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VHHQ ILUPV¶ ZRUOGZLGH RSHUDWLRQV FRPH XQGHU LQtense scrutiny. Consumerism and 
consumption have become global in nature, and this has led to the increased prevalence and 
visibility of consumer campaigns (Pearson and Seyfang, 2001, p.53). These have articulated 
concerns over MNC activities within the globalised free market, targeting firms for 
malpractice. Advances in communication have provided avenues for local groups to join 
together and raise issues they believe to be pertinent (Rosenau, 2005, p.30). An ethical 
investment movement has also emerged, underlining increasing investor sensitivity to the 
social and environmental performance of companies (Pearson and Seyfang, 2001, p.54). 
Subsequently corporations are increasingly finding their practices exposed to public scrutiny 
(Bondy et al., 2007, p.434). These developments have resulted in companies feeling growing 
pressure, and MNCs have begun to participate in global rule making and implementation 
around their activities, moving into roles traditionally reserved for the governments of nation 
states (Albareda, 2008, p.431).  
$ ³ZRUOG VRFLHW\ ZLWKRXW D ZRUOG VWDWH DQG ZLWKRXW D ZRUOG JRYHUQPHQW´ 6FKHUHU DQG
Palazzo, 2008, p.421) has been created, and consequently governance is no longer a domain 
solely reserved for nation states (Scherer et al., 2006, p.506). Whilst globalisation has 
facilitated the increased integration of economic activity and social interaction between 
distant communities, it has also fragmented the framework of rules governing society as 
externalities of economic activity have become transnational in scope (Rosenau, 2005, p.23). 
Civil society has mobilised and actively criticised companies for exploiting these deficits in 
international regulation, and governments are increasingly looking to share the 
responsibilities of global governance with other actors, including corporations (Visser, 2008, 
p.483). Resultantly, a growing number of MNCs are taking on political roles and regulating 
their own behaviour to help avoid some of the social ills caused by globalisation. As there is 
often no general rule for companies to follow in their global operations, companies are 
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increasingly utilising ethics as a guiding principle for their activities (Scherer et al., 2006, 
p.515). This has manifested in various corporate social responsibility initiatives such as 
internal codes of conduct governing staff treatment, non-governmental organisation 
engagement over sourcing policies, and the voluntary adoption of international standards 
covering labour rights. 8OWLPDWHO\ EXVLQHVVHV DUH RIWHQ YLHZHG DV ³WKH µEDG JX\V¶ FDXVLQJ
HQYLURQPHQWDO GLVDVWHUV ILQDQFLDO VFDQGDOV DQG VRFLDO LOOV´ 6FKHUHU DQG 3DOD]]R 
p.414), profiting from international governance deficits whilst negatively impacting the 
communities in which they operate. Yet increasingly, MNCs are being touted as a solution to 
issues of global regulation, as traditional state institutions are often unable or unwilling to 
effectively tackle international problems such as human rights abuses, environmental 
destruction, and poor labour conditions (ibid, p.414). Adequate governance which is able to 
effectively resolve problems on the global agenda does not exist DQG WKXV FRPSDQLHV¶
corporate social responsibility policies are YLHZHGDVDPHWKRG³WRSOXJWKHJRYHUQDQFHJDSV´
(Visser, 2008, p.483).  
 
2.2 Supply Chain Issues 
One business function where the effects of globalisation have been acutely felt is the supply 
chain. A supply FKDLQFDQEHGHILQHGDV³WKHSURFHVVE\ZKLFKWHFKQRORJ\LVFRPELQHGZLWK
material and labour inputs, and then processed inputs are assembled, marketed, and 
distributed. A single firm may consist of only one link in this process´.RJXWS15). 
Thus, whilst a firm may only sell a good and not be involved in pulling together disparate raw 
materials to create it, companies are increasingly finding themselves compelled to actively 
manage their entire supply chain (Visser, 2008, p.488). As previously articulated, companies 
in different countries are subject to different regulatory regimes. Globalisation has thus led to 
changes in patterns of production and trade worldwide, with MNCs being able to relocate 
14 
 
their production facilities to other countries, a process that has been primarily driven by 
financial considerations (Kolk et al., 1999, p.144). The expansion of international trade has 
been attributed to the increased availability of unregulated labour as an input for production 
(Pearson and Seyfang, 2001, p.51). MNCs now have the ability to move their production to 
countries which have minimal legislation covering not only labour rights, but other aspects of 
sustainability such as pollution emissions. Whilst companies were able to benefit from 
reduced costs and hence increased profit margins, instances of business activities excessively 
damaging the environment (Kolk et al., 1999, p.145), paying low wages (Dhanarajan, 2005, 
p.532), and utilising child labour (Kolk et al., 1999, p.144) increased.  
 
Furthermore, globalisation has given rise to different industrial capabilities flourishing in a 
variety of countries across the world (Gereffi et al., 2005, p.78) Companies have traditionally 
utilised an integrated supply chain where the firm executes the majority of the processes 
which transform raw materials into a final product. However, globalisation and this 
widespread growth of industrial capabilities worldwide has enabled companies to 
increasingly split up their supply chain (Scherer et al., 2006, p.512DQGWKXV³>UHGHILQH@WKHLU
FRUH FRPSHWHQFLHV WR IRFXV RQ«WKH KLJKHVW YDOXH-added segments of manufacturing and 
services, while reducing their direct ownership of non-core functions such as generic service 
DQG YROXPH SURGXFWLRQ´ *HUHIIL HW DO  S 7KLV ³GLIIXVLRQ RI LQGXVWU\ VXSSO\
FKDLQV´/RFNHDQG5RPLVSKDVSURGXFHGDGYDQWDJHVIRU01&VEXWSUREOHPVIRU
the suppliers they purchase from. Like the relocation of production facilities, the decision to 
outsource certain aspects of production is also motivated by profitability considerations (Kolk 
and van Tulder, 2005, p.17), reflective of the global financial mDUNHW¶VSURSHQVLW\ WR VWUHVV
profit as a proxy for investment return (Scherer and Palazzo, 2008, p.418). This desire to 
reduce costs and the ability to source where it is most financially efficient has left suppliers 
15 
 
facing the most risk (Dhanarajan, 2005, p.530). Many global supply chains are characterised 
by short term contracts to meet EX\HUV¶QHHGVIRUIOH[LELOLW\ibid, p.531), suppliers have thus 
faced short delivery expectations and decreased profit margins (Kaufman et al., 2004, p.98) 
as they attempW WR PDLQWDLQ EXVLQHVV UHODWLRQVKLSV LQ IDFH RI EX\HUV¶ SRZHU WR VZLWFK WR
cheaper suppliers. This has inevitably reduced the priority given by suppliers to social and 
environmental considerations, and again resulted in some of the aforementioned negative 
consequences.  
 
The rise in consumer awareness of sustainability issues and investor expectations regarding 
the social and environmental performance has driven MNCs towards responsible supply 
chain management (UNGC, 2010, p.14). Multinationals have been accused of being 
exploiters (Millington, 2008, p.364), especially in developing countries where laws are 
weaker, despite companies not being directly involved in the production of certain materials 
that go into their final goods. Hall (2000, p.457) argues that the responsibility for regulation 
belongs to the firm engaging in an activity, whilst Millington (2008, p.363) concurs that the 
legal obligation for social and environmental impact is passed on to the supplier when 
outsourcing takes place. So although it would seem unfair to hold firms accountable for the 
behaviour of their suppliers (ibid, p.367), negative impacts of supplier production are still 
associated and attributed to lead companies by civil society (ibid, p.364). Despite their 
apparent lack of direct involvement, companies are criticised for not encouraging good 
conditions everywhere (Albareda, 2008, p.432). So if a supplier is found guilty of violating 
KXPDQULJKWVLQWKHLUIDFWRU\WKDWVXSSOLHUV¶EX\HUVDUHSHUFHLYHGDVFRPSOLFLWLQWKRVHDEXVes 
(Dhanarajan, 2005, p.531). An example of this is when Nike were criticised throughout the 
1990s for poor working conditions at some of their suppliers, including underpaid workers in 
Indonesia and child labour in Cambodia (Locke and Romis, 2007, p.55). Similarly, if a 
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company purchases from a supplier based in a country with an oppressive political regime, 
civil society might accuse them of lending support to that government (Kolk et al., 1999, 
p.145). This is reflected in the 2000 United Nations report WKDW H[SRVHG KRZ 'H %HHUV¶
diamonds provided indirect financing for a rebel group in Angola (Maignan et al., 2002, 
p.642).  
 
These events did considerable damage to the corporate brand and reputations of the 
companies involved, and from such scandals emerged a shift towards major companies 
committing to promoting sustainability throughout their supply chains (Visser, 2008, p.488). 
Nike initially publicly rejected any responsibility for their supplieUV¶ZRUNLQJFRQGLWLRQVEXW
has now started initiatives to DGGUHVVLVVXHVVXUURXQGLQJWKHLUVXSSOLHUV¶KXPDQULJKWVUHFRUGV
(Scherer et al., 2006, p.521). This underlines a growing trend of companies taking steps to 
proactively manage their supply chains (Millington, 2008, p.365) to encourage sustainability, 
popularly termed ethical supply chain management (ESCM) (Gyongyi, 2005, p.3) or socially 
responsible buying (Maignan et al., 2002, p.642). ESCM DLPV ³to create, protect and grow 
long term environmental, social and economic value for all stakeholders involved in bringing 
products and services to market´81*& 2010, SDQG LQFOXGHVD³FUDGOH-to-grave notion 
RI OLIH F\FOH DVVHVVPHQW´ *\Rngyi, 2005, p.3) which accounts for the social and 
environmental impact from the first step of the production process to actual consumption or 
disposal of the final product.  
 
Studies investigating whether such practices positively impact the bottom line are mixed, 
representing the first issue companies face when trying to implement ESCM. Carter and 
-HQQLQJV¶  S HPSLULFal study found that the involvement of company purchasing 
functions in socially responsible buying resulted in increased commitment to relationships 
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with suppliers and increased trust. These improved relationships throughout the supply chain 
lead to improved overall supplier performance. Similarly, other business case reasons for 
engaging in ESCM include minimising business disruption from external impacts, reducing 
the cost of material inputs, increasing labour productivity, and creating efficiency across 
supply chains (UNGC, 2010, p.13). Yet Millington (2008, p.378) observes that the 
UHODWLRQVKLS EHWZHHQ (6&0 DQG D ILUP¶V ILQDQFLDO SHUIRUPDQFH VWLOO UHPDLQV XQFHUWDLQ
arguing that it may negatively impact competitiveness, particularly in low cost industries 
where a lot of abuses take place. Underlining this lack of clear economic imperative for 
implementing ESCM is the fact that the purchasing function is rarely represented at board 
level, with procurement managers predominantly middle-management positions (ibid, p.377). 
Locke et al. (2009, p.326) similarly lament that the purchasing function lacks influence when 
deciding whether to continue business with a supplier with problems, reiterating the lack of 
priority top management may give to ESCM. The sheer complexity of modern global supply 
chains is another huge barrier to the implementation of ESCM (Kolk and van Tulder, 2005, 
p.17). In 2004, Nike had just over 24,000 employees, the majority of which were employed in 
the United States of America (USA). Yet more than 800 suppliers in 51 different countries 
manufactured their products, making Nike indirectly responsible for over 600,000 more 
workers (Locke and Romis, 2007, p.55). This illustrates the vast number of supplier 
relationships MNCs could enter, and as a result HQJDJLQJZLWKDQG PRQLWRULQJ WKHP LV ³DQ
LPSRVVLEOHWDVN´8WWLQJS 
 
Although the private sector has faced increased demand for socially responsible practices, 
there are still issues surrounding the definition of what their responsibilities entail and what 
construes corporate misbehaviour (Taylor et al., 2009, p.1). These issues are reflected in the 
implementation of ESCM. Companies have been accused of being complicit in corrupt 
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practices such as bribery, yet the definition of these practices remains unclear (Gordon and 
Miyake, 2001, p.162). Some companies may even be justified in arguing that they are victims 
of extortion rather than perpetrators of bribery (ibid, p.162), further underlining the 
difficulties MNCs have to navigate when attempting to manage their global supply chains. 
Whilst traditionally companies could turn to law to guide their decisions, widely accepted 
international principles that govern ethical behaviour in the supply chain do not generally 
exist (Gordon and Miyake, 2001, p.162). 
 
6XEVHTXHQWO\WKH³LQWHUQDWLRQDOEXVLQHVVFRPPXQLW\LVVWLOOWU\LQJWRFRPHWRJULSVZLWKWKH
complex ethical questions that arise in defining appropriate business conduct´ibid, p.162), 
and this situation has arisen due to the effect globalisation has had on business operations and, 
more specifically, supply chains. Firms no longer internalise all the processes and capabilities 
required to bring a product or service to the market (Gereffi et al., 2005, p.81), allowing them 
to source where it is most financially efficient and reducing the direct control they have over 
LQSXWV LQWR SURGXFWLRQ $V D UHVXOW ³VXSSO\ QHWZRUNV KDYH EHHQ VXEVWLWXWHG IRU PDUNHWV´
(Millington, 2008, p.363), and this has led to companies indirectly contributing to 
environmental degradation, human rights abuses, and the sustenance of oppressive political 
regimes through their procurement practices. A huge driver of CSR has been the discovery of 
poor working conditions in MNC supply chains (Visser, 2008, p.488), and ESCM is 
consequently viewed as an opportunity to disperse social and environmental initiatives 
(Millington, 2008, p.377). Throughout the 1990s, suppliers were increasingly encouraged to 
comply with rules set out by buyers in order to minimise the risk of harm occurring in supply 
chains (Van Tulder, 2006, p.241). Resultantly, the implementation and monitoring of 
corporate codes of conduct has become hugely important in this process of diffusing ethical 
practice throughout global supply chains (Millington, 2008, p.377).  
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2.3 Codes of Conduct 
The usage oI WKH WHUP µFRGH RI FRQGXFW¶ &RC) varies throughout the literature and no 
standard definition currently exists (Bondy et al., 2008, p.295). Most definitions tend to 
emphasise that CoCs are measures voluntarily taken by companies (Amaeshi and Amao, 
2009, p.227), that can be utilised to influence the behaviour of different groups (Van Tulder, 
2006, p.240), and that they aim to influence the behaviour of different groups towards a 
specific set of issues (Diller, 1999, p.102). For the purposes of this dissertation, CoCs will be 
GHILQHGDV³JXLGHOLQHVUHFRPPHQGDWLRQVRUUXOHVLVVXHGE\JURXSVZLWKLQVRFLHW\WRHQKDQFH
responsible behaviour of business´)UDQVHQDQG.RONS7KLVGHILQLWLRQLVXVHful 
because it indicates that CoCs aim to influence and define corporate behaviour, that the 
adoption of CoCs by firms is ultimately a voluntary action, and that CoCs can emanate from 
groups other than businesses.  
 
Within the context of globalisation, firms have become political actors that have 
responsibilities beyond the economic, and simply complying with laws of the communities 
where they operate is no longer acceptable (Scherer and Palazzo, 2008, p.419). Thus in terms 
of global supply chains, CoCs have been described aV ³WKH ILUVW VWHS´RI (6&0 *\Rngyi, 
2005, p.12). This is because CoCs can be used to influence the behaviour of suppliers and 
subcontractors (Utting, 2002, p.83), thus extending CSR initiatives beyond production 
processes directly owned by a company. Given the public pressures MNCs face regarding 
their worldwide operations (Albareda, 2008, p.438) and the inability of many governments to 
effectively implement sustainability legislation (Locke and Romis, 2007, p.54), increasing 
numbers of companies are adopting CoCs to govern their conduct in potentially unclear and 
risky areas.  CoCs ³allow corporations to symbolically demonstrate their willingness to take 
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responsibilities and at the same time define the limits and extent of the responsibilities´
(Amaeshi and Amao, 2009, p.226), and so help them avoid the grey areas of identifying 
exactly how they should proceed in a given situation. In the 1970s, international 
organisations such as International Labour Organisation attempted to design CoCs (Fransen 
and Kolk, 2007, p.668), but their lack of international consensus coupled with the increase in 
neo-liberal policy which undermined the acceptability of institutional standards (Pearson and 
Seyfang, 2001, p.51) meant that codes were voluntary and had little effect (Kolk and van 
Tulder, 2005, p.5). In the 1990s, attempts to create standards for corporate conduct re-
emerged (ibid, SDQGD³ZDYHRI&RCs´3HDUVRQDQG6H\IDQJSDSSHDUHGIURP
various sources with varying effectiveness.  
 
One source of CoCs is companies themselves, with company codes being written by a 
representative of the company with minimal input from outside groups (Bondy et al., 2007, 
p.437). These are particularly advantageous to firms as they are able to tailor relations with 
external organisations to their own needs, motivate their employees through better working 
conditions and EHVWRZ OHJLWLPDF\ XSRQ WKHLU ILUP¶V SURGXFWV 0LOOLQJWRQ  S
Issuance of company codes also displays that the corporation acknowledges the importance 
of certain CSR issues and that any behavioural change with regards to CoCs is driven from 
within the firm rather than by external bodies (Bondy et al., 2007, p.437). Despite their ability 
to function as a tool to raise awareness of CSR issues within companies, company codes have 
been criticised for merely EHLQJ³35H[HUFLVHV´.RONDQGYDQ7XOGHUSDOORZLng 
01&V WR DGRSW DQ LQVLQFHUH ³WUXVW PH¶ DWWLWXGH´ WR &65 LVVXHV DV RSSRVHG WR active steps 
(Utting, 2002, p.71). Company codes often materialise as a vision of where the company 
would like itself to be in the future, and therefore do not explicitly reveal how companies 
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operate in practice (Bondy et al., 2007, p.437). As a result, such CoCs have tended to be ad 
hoc and piecemeal in nature, ignoring crucial issues (Utting, 2002, p.70).  
 
Another type of CoC is that issued by industry or business associations representing 
companies in a specific sector. These have been praised for providing a transparent 
benchmark from which to build trust within an industry (Bondy et al., 2007, p.442), and also 
for maintaining a level playing field between corporate players as each company incur 
identical costs for developing and implementing a code. Subsequently, these initiatives help 
to establish CSR commitments throughout an industry and improve corporate performance 
above legal requirements (Diller, 1999, p.100). However such codes have been criticised for 
EHLQJ ³UHODWLYHO\ JHQHUDO DQG YDJXH´ )UDQVHQ DQG .RON  S UHIOHFWLQJ DQ
XQGHUO\LQJ ³ORZHVW FRPPRQ GHQRPLQDWRU SULQFLSOH´ .RON DQG YDQ 7XOGHU  S DV
business associations try to attract as many subscribers within the industry as possible. The 
likelihood of companies actually complying with industry CoCs is also low (Van Tulder, 
2006, p.242), reiterating their ineffectiveness as a tool to influence corporate behaviour.  
 
International Governmental Organisations (IGOs) such as the UN and OECD have also 
issued various CoCs. Codes drawn up by IGOs are often broad in reach due to the 
international gravitas such organisations hold (Fransen and Kolk, 2007, p.669), and thus 
provide a potentially useful outlet for widespread adoption. IGO codes tend to be stricter than 
company codes (Kolk and van Tulder, 2005, p.12). They also include a greater degree of 
measurable criteria than company or industry CoCs. This allows them to be monitored more 
effectively. Furthermore, the often provide clear sanctions for those who do not comply (Van 
Tulder, 2006, p.242). Yet similar to industry codes, those issued by IGOs suffer from the 
³ORZHVWFRPPRQGHQRPLQDWRU´SKHQRPHQRQ)UDQVHQDQG.RONSDQGDUHZHDN
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in terms of their content (van Tulder, 2006, p.243). Initiatives such as the United Nations 
Global Compact are also criticised for adopting a paternal attitude that inherently trusts 
corporations without providing adequate mechanisms for control (Scherer et al., 2006, p.521).  
 
The final, and seemingly most effective, type of code described in the literature is the multi-
stakeholder code, whicK LV FUHDWHG WKURXJK ³a process of bargaining, negotiating and 
compromise between diverse groups coming from government, business coalitions, NGOs, 
and academia for example, where the aim is to meet as many of the needs as possible through 
generating conseQVXV´ (Bondy et al., 2007, p.437). This brings together different types of 
expertise (Fransen and Kolk, 2007, p.668) resulting LQ QRW RQO\ DQ ³LPSRUWDQW OHDUQLQJ
SURFHVV´ 8WWLQJ  S EHWZHHQ FRPSDQLHV DQG WKHLU VWDNHKROGHUV EXW DOVR D PRUH
thorough assessment of corporate practice than other types of codes (Bondy et al., 2007, 
p.437). This is due in part to the fact that multi-stakeholder CoCs are the most specific in 
terms of the rules and policies they set out, and also often demand explicit management 
commitment for the implementation of the CoC (Fransen and Kolk, 2007, p.674). Whilst 
there has been a proliferation of company codes addressing the same issue but with different 
policies and requirements, multi-stakeholder initiatives can help to harmonise and standardise 
behaviour around a certain issue (Utting, 2002, p.84). Furthermore, the act of corporate self-
regulation reflects that political processes are being operated by actors lacking democratic 
legitimacy (Scherer et al., 2006, p.518). A multi-stakeholder approach to CoCs ensures that 
such rule-making tools do retain at least some democratic legitimacy. 
 
Overall, CoCs are a useful tool as they can alleviate the need for legislation (Bondy et al., 
2007, p.441) by filling in regulatory gaps (van Tulder, 2006, p.240) in a less costly manner 
than formal legal intervention (Bondy et al., 2007, p.442). This offers an outlet to regulate 
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business behaviour across borders within the global economy (Bondy, 2008, p.18). From a 
pragmatic perspective, codes can create a competitive advantage for the corporation by 
generating reputational trust and loyalty (Fort and Westermann-Behaylo, 2008, p.59). CoCs 
can also result in new market opportunities for MNCs and increased control over their 
business partners (Kolk and van Tulder, 2005, p.4). Some argue that they are an appropriate 
flexible response to global production networks and the associated governance deficits that 
arise (Locke and Romis, 2007, p.54). The impact of codes also transcends individual 
companies (Kolk and van Tulder, 2005, p.19), influencing the behaviour of other actors but 
also allowing other organisations some control over corporate decision making (Bondy et al., 
 S 8OWLPDWHO\ WKH\ DOVR PDNH DQ LPSRUWDQW VWHS RI LQFRUSRUDWLQJ ³ethics and 
PRUDOLW\ LQWR WKH EXVLQHVV PDQDJHPHQW´ $PDHVKL DQG $PDR  S XQGHUOLQLQJ D
FRPSDQ\¶VZLOOLQJQHVVWRWDNHUHVSRQVLELOLW\IRUWKHLUVRFLDODQGHQYLURQPHQWDOLPSDFW 
 
However, many argue that it is the business case that undermines the overall efficacy of CoCs, 
as motivations for adopting codes are driven by commercial reasons rather than a direct 
imperative for responsibility (Pearson and Seyfang, 2001, p.66). This raises long standing 
TXHVWLRQVUHJDUGLQJWKH³PDQDJHULDOFDSWXUHRI&65´ (Amaeshi and Amao, 2009, p.233), as 
companies can utilise codes WR GHFHLYH WKHLU VWDNHKROGHUV LQ DQ DFW RI ³ZLQGRZ GUHVVLQJ´
(Scherer et al., 2006, p.518). The implementation of a CoC can therefore entail a reactive 
response to external pressure rather than significant engagement with an issue (Millington, 
2008, p.376). Critics also lament the sheer quantity of different codes that have emerged 
surrounding similar issues (Utting, 2002, p.84), making it difficult to determine what 
elements of an issue and which organisations are covered by the CoC (Pearson and Seyfang, 
2001, p.68). MDQ\LQGXVWULHVKDYHREVHUYHGD³WUDGHRIIEHWZHHQTXDOLW\DQGVFDOH´8WWLQJ
2002, p.87) within codes, as their content suffers in an attempt to encourage widespread use 
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of CoCs. The involvement of international organisations such as the UN in the development 
DQG DSSOLFDWLRQ RI FRGHV UDLVHV WKH GDQJHU RI ³EOXHZDVK´ ibid, p.88), as companies gain 
undeserved reputational credibility through their association with such agencies. 
Consequently, compliance and monitoring are hugely important factors in determining the 
usefulness of CoCs in addressing a particular issue.  
 
The thoroughness of a CoC depends on its compliance likelihood ± ³WKHSUREDELOLW\WKDWILUPV
will conform in practice to codes either proclaimed by themselves or developed by other 
actors´.RONHWDOS, and the implementation of a CoC thus puts great demand on 
inspection protocols (Locke et al., 2009, p.322). Hence recent debates regarding codes have 
focused on what mechanisms can be used to ensure compliance (Kolk et al., 1999, p.167), as 
codes seriously fall short due to the current lack of enforcement instruments (Pearson and 
Seyfang, 2001, p.52). CoCs need to establish monitoring procedures (Gyongyi, 2005, p.12) to 
enhance their compliance likelihood (Kolk et al., 1999, p.9), as without them, codes suffer 
from the risk of simply being used as a marketing tool (Locke et al., 2009, p.324).  However, 
a general consensus has not been reached as to how to create indicators which can thoroughly 
assess the social responsibility performance of companies (Kolk et al., 1999, p.147), and thus 
the effects of CoCs are inherently difficult to measure (Diller, 1999, p.120). As codes are also 
voluntary and not legally binding, commitments made through such processes are difficult to 
monitor and enforce (ibid, p.125). Additionally, the wide range of actors involved in 
developing CoC mean that there is no obvious candidate who FRXOG PRQLWRU FRGHV¶
provisions and report finding to interested parties (Pearson and Seyfang, 2001, p.68). 
Consequently there are serious difficulties in establishing effective monitoring and 
verification processes (Utting, 2002, p.104).  
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To demonstrate the enforcement and implementation of CoCs, MNCs tend to rely on third 
party monitors (Amaeshi and Amao, 2009, p.233), traditionally being professional audit 
FRPSDQLHV )UDQVHQ DQG .RON  S 8QIRUWXQDWHO\ WKHUH H[LVWV ³DPSOH FULWLTXH RQ
WKHSURSHUIXQFWLRQLQJRISURIHVVLRQDODXGLWV´ibid, p.678), with wide acknowledgement that 
auditors uncover violations rather than identify root causes of problems (Locke et al., 2009, 
p.328). Companies either pass or fail audits without receiving help on how to improve 
(Bendell, 2005, p.367), and their often confidential nature means that audits cannot be 
effectively used by other parties to hold companies accountable for code implementation 
(ibid, S 5HVXOWDQWO\ WKHUH DSSHDUV WR EH VHULRXV OLPLWDWLRQV LQ DXGLWRUV¶ DELOLW\ WR
monitor codes (Kolk and van Tulder, 2005, p.15), which is exacerbated by the high prices 
professional companies charge for their services. This reduces the amount of time over which 
audits are carried out as subjects try to cut costs (Bendell, 2005, p.366), and eventually 
compromises the quality of the verification process.  
 
Ultimately, only a small percentage of the 60,000 MNCs worldwide participate in multi-
VWDNHKROGHU FRGHV 8WWLQJ  S DQG WKLV SDUWLFLSDWLRQ FDQ VLPSO\ ³OLPLW WKH OHJDO
OLDELOLW\ RI JOREDO EUDQGV´ /RFNe and Romis, 2007, p.54). Furthermore, there is an 
overwhelming tendency for companies involved in CoC to already be industry leaders in 
CSR initiatives (Bondy et al., 2007, p.444), thus reducing their overall scope for change. As 
CoCs DSSDUHQWO\ ³ODFN WUDQVSDUHQF\ LQ DSSOLFDWLRQ´ 'LOOHU  S WKH\ KDYH WKH
potential to be powerful initiatives only where companies have an actual intention to 
implement as well as adopt (Bondy et al., 2007, p.445). Resultantly, the successful 
implementation of a code presents not only a huge opportunity to develop CSR throughout 
supply chains (Millington, 2008, p.378), but also a useful outlet to regulate the power of 
MNCs and redistribute it among various stakeholders (Bondy et al., 2007, p.448). In the long 
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run, CoCs FDQSURYHWREH³DYLWDOLQSXWIRUWKHFUHDWLRQRIQHZLQWHUQDWLRQDOLQVWLWXWLRQVLQDQ
HUDRIXQFHUWDLQW\UHJDUGLQJWKHVKDSHRIQDWLRQDODQGLQWHUQDWLRQDOUHJXODWRU\UHJLPHV´.RON
and van Tulder, 2005, p.19).  
 
2.4 Conclusion 
This literature review has shown that transnational corporate activity has grown through the 
process of globalisation, and this has lead to companies contributing to negative events such 
as environmental degradation and human rights abuses. Underlining this is government 
inability to adequately regulate these issues as they transcend the national borders that nation-
states have traditionally governed. MNCs have thus increased in size and power, and also 
operate under minimal legislative requirements. However, globalisation has also contributed 
to the growth of civil society which has mobilised and increasingly scrutinised corporate 
activity. Resultantly, businesses are increasingly taking on political roles, contributing to the 
formulation of rules that self-regulate their operations.  
 
These processes have manifested themselves in global supply chains, where companies have 
increasingly relocated their production facilities or simply outsourced them to external 
suppliers in other countries in order to benefit from reduced costs and weaker regulatory 
regimes. The tendency to prioritise financial considerations within environments bereft of 
effective legislation has led to negative social and environmental consequences. Public 
exposure of these consequences have led civil society to criticise companies for being 
implicit in creating these externalities, and recent years have seen a shift in corporations 
proactively managing their supply chain to mitigate these risks. However, companies have 
not only struggled to monitor and influence their supply chains because of their vastness and 
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complexity, but also encountered difficulties in defining what corporate supply chain 
responsibilities should entail.   
 
Companies have sought to define these responsibilities through the use of codes of conduct, 
which are voluntarily adopted to influence and define corporate behaviour around a certain 
issue. These can emanate from various sources such as companies themselves, industry 
associations, international organisations, or multi-stakeholder initiatives where different 
parties work together to formulate a code. However, codes have varied in their efficacy, and 
have been criticised for their lack of specificity, their tendency to be weakly implemented and 
complied with, and the sheer quantity of them that cover similar issues. Furthermore, only a 
small proportion of companies are involved in codes of conduct, reflecting their apparent 
inability to widely contribute to the institutionalisation of responsible business practice.   
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CHAPTER THREE: CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
 
The following conceptual framework has been derived from the literature review, and this 
will help to direct the research, structure, and argument for this dissertation.  
 
Figure 1: Conceptual Framework Diagram 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As outlined in Figure 1, the literature review uncovered three distinct but interlinking fields 
within CSR scholarship. Globalisation has led to both supply chain opportunities and risks for 
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companies, and one of the emerging means for governing corporate activity across national 
borders where no effective international regulation currently exists is the use of codes of 
conduct. 
 
These processes are all drivers behind the OECD Guidance, and resultantly, this dissertation 
will be contextualised according to these fields. Globalisation has allowed the sourcing of 
raw materials to take place from the DRC. The fragile political situation has resulted in 
mineral supply chain issues for companies, as NGOs and civil society groups are criticising 
them for their implicit contribution to poor working conditions, human rights abuses, and the 
sustenance of conflict in the region. This has given rise to the development of a CoC in the 
form of the OECD Guidance. 
 
Whilst the Guidance will be issued by an international body in the OECD, a multi-
stakeholder approach to its development has been taken, allowing various organisations to 
provide input into their content. As the information provided by the majority of multi-
stakeholder initiatives fail to reveal why some groups are involved and others are not 
(Fransen and Kolk, 2007, p.676), it is worthwhile to uncover which actors were involved, 
why they were consulted, and how this will influence the content of the Guidance. 
 
The CoC literature criticises the content of CoCs for various reasons, including their lack of 
specificity and the absence of effective compliance mechanisms. 7KH*XLGDQFH¶VFRQWHQWZLOO
therefore be analysed according to how it aims to specifically tackle problems within the 
'5&¶V PLQHUDO VXSSO\ FKDLQ KRZ LW addresses the limitations of codes outlined in the 
literature, and whether it contains consequences for non-compliance. 
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This issue of compliance raises concerns over the voluntary nature of adopting CoCs, as 
companies can potentially claim adherence without adequately implementing any changes. 
This chapter will thus examine the challenges surrounding implementation, incorporating 
specific reference to E-TASC and how such management tools can potentially complement 
the release of the Guidance. Thorough implementation of the Guidance ultimately depends on 
companies adhering to it, and thus the Guidance will be evaluated according to its 
compliance likelihood. 
 
Finally, should the Guidance succeed in making any difference on the ground, its principles 
ultimately need to become institutionalised practice. If there is only partial uptake across the 
electronics industry, minerals will continue to be sourced from conflict mines and companies 
will indirectly contribute WR WKH '5&¶V SUREOHPV SHUVLVWLQJ. Bringing together the analysis 
from previous chapters, this section will attempt to identify how the Guidance can become 
institutionalised best practice, the aspects inhibiting its ability to do so, and any other 
potentiaO GHYHORSPHQWV ZKLFK FRXOG IXUWKHU WKH *XLGDQFH¶V DJHQGD DQG OHDG WR ZLGHVSUHDG
adherence.  
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CHAPTER FOUR: METHODOLOGY 
 
4.1 Materials  
Research for this dissertation was conducted using a variety of materials. Formal interviews 
were carried out with people representing Achilles, academia, industry associations, and 
corporations as outlined in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2: Table of interviewees 
Organisation Information Position 
Achilles Director 
Achilles Senior Manager  
Leading European business school Senior Academic specialising in 
analysing the scope of CSR  
Leading European business school Academic specialising in the economics 
of developing countries 
GeSI Senior Member 
GeSI Working Group Senior Participant 
Leading multinational telecommunications 
company  
Senior Director 
Leading European provider of broadband 
and telecommunications 
Senior Manager 
 
These interviews were conducted with the aim of identifying the key issues at stake regarding 
conflict minerals, the strengths and perceptions of actors involved in the development of the 
Guidance, and the necessary practical considerations of developing and implementing 
international CoCs. Participants from Achilles provided insights into the practical 
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implementation of the Guidance and how this would affect their efficacy. The academic 
interviewees provided expert knowledge of multi-stakeholder initiatives, the implications of 
YDULRXV SDUWLHV¶ LQYROYHPHQW LQ WKH GHYHORSPHQW SURFHVV DQG DQ XQGHUVWDQGLQJ RI WKH
political considerations of such guidelines. Industry association leaders offered a deeper first-
hand account of the Guidance development, a greater understanding of why various actors 
were involved, and a sector-based perspective on the key issues facing the electronics 
industry. Corporate leaders complemented this through their knowledge of the practical 
considerations of implementing the Guidance. These interviewees were approached as they 
all played a role in either developing the Guidance or aiding its implementation. Their roles 
in different sectors allowed for a variety of perspectives and a richer understanding of this 
particular multi-stakeholder initiative. Further primary material was generated through the 
use of meetings and general correspondence regarding the internship project. These sources 
offered a first-hand insight into the Guidance development process and the pragmatic 
concerns of various parties, all within a natural work setting which potentially contributed to 
their accuracy. 
 
Various documents were also analysed with the draft OECD Guidance being utilised to not 
only understand its content, but also to determine exactly what is expected of companies. 
Other OECD documents were also examined to obtain a greater understanding of the 
Guidance development process and how actors were incorporated into this. Meanwhile, 
certain UN publications were considered to gauge international political interest on the 
mineral issue and the broader institutional context of the DRC. NGO reports were particularly 
useful in obtaining an understanding of the mineral supply chain out of the DRC and a 
representation of the conditions on the ground. Along with media sources, these reports also 
33 
 
provided an insight into the pressure being applied on companies and details of previous 
initiatives aimed DWWDFNOLQJWKH'5&¶VQDWXUDOUHVRXUFHSUREOHPV 
 
4.2 Research Methods  
This GLVVHUWDWLRQ LQYROYHG D GHJUHH RI HWKQRJUDSK\ DV , ZDV DWWHPSWLQJ WR ³GHYHORS DQ
XQGHUVWDQGLQJ DQG LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ RI FXOWXUH´ 0F$XOH\  S DURXQG LQWHUQDWLRQDO
organisations, companies, and regulatory initiatives. Through my internship, I established a 
rapport with people within Achilles and the organisations they were liaising with, selected 
people to talk to once I familiarised myself with the placement project at hand, and 
investigated relevant documents in order to observe the organisations and groups of people I 
was working with. I then interpreted and analysed the data I generated in an attempt to reveal 
the structures and systems underpinning international guidelines - the basis of this 
dissertation. Throughout all this I took a non-covert approach to my research, making my role 
and intentions clear to all relevant parties (ibid, p.90).  
 
As my placement entailed working for and with both Achilles and the OECD, the overlap 
between my dissertation and my internship meant that I engaged in a significant amount of 
FROODERUDWLYHUHVHDUFK7KLVLQYROYHV³FRQGXFWLQJUHVHDUFKZLWKVRPHRWKHUSDUWLHVHLWKHUDVD
member of a team located in the same place, or working with people who are more distant in 
some respect´ (DVWHUE\-Smith, 2008, p.43). I worked across disciplines, collaborating with 
software specialists to understand the feasibility of validating supplier questionnaires, and 
between countries, liaising with the OECD in Paris regarding the development of the 
Guidelines and Achilles staff internationally to determine third party verification of supplier 
practices. I firmly believe that collaborative research in this instance allowed me to increase 
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the scope and scale of the research (ibid, p.44), giving me a greater insight into a variety of 
processes that aid the development and implementation of such Guidance.  
 
5HVHDUFKDOVRHQWDLOHG WKHXVHRI LQWHUYLHZVZKLFKFRQVLVWRI³one person, the interviewer, 
asking questions and directing conversation with one or more other persons, their 
LQWHUYLHZHH´ 6LPVS7KHVHDUHH[HFXWHGZLWKWKHDLPRI³REWDLQLQJNQRZOHGJH
DERXW WKH UHVSRQGHQW¶V ZRUOG´ $OYHVVRQ DQG 6YHQVVRQ  S ,QWHUYLHZV ZHUH
carried out over the telephone due to the geographical distribution of participants. A semi-
VWUXFWXUHGQDWXUHZDVXVHGDV ,ZDV LQWHUHVWHG LQ XQFRYHULQJ P\ LQWHUYLHZHH¶VGHILQLWLRQRI
what was pertinent to different topics (Sims, 2008, p.117), and thus a certain degree of 
control over the interview process was sacrificed to participants to facilitate this goal. Having 
a record of the interview is described as a key step for the interviewer (ibid, p.118), and audio 
files and transcripts of each interview were kept1. This not only allowed interviews to be 
replayed, but also assisted the generation of new insights and detection of patterns within 
responses.   
 
My role as an intern effectively made me a participant observer, where by working in the 
field, the researcher can ³uncover accounts which may not have been accessed by more 
IRUPDOPHWKRGVOLNHLQWHUYLHZV´$QGHUVRQa, p.150). This took various forms, ranging 
from attending formal meetings and telephone conferences to simple e-mail correspondence. 
, WRRN D ³SDUWLFipant-as-REVHUYHU´ ibid, p.150) approach, openly disclosing to involved 
parties my intent to observe events, which allowed me to better integrate into the 
organisations I was encountering and develop relationships with the people I was working 
with. This subsequently endowed me with greater insights into organisational life as I was 
                                               
1
 Transcripts available upon request. 
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able to delve deeper into areas that are not ordinarily accessible to outsiders (McAuley, 2008, 
p.90).   
 
This process of embedding myself within the organisations I was working with raised 
questions of access DV , VRXJKW WR ³JHW LQ´ E\ ³JHWWLQJ RQ´ %XFKDQDQ HW DO  0\
internship meant that I was required to spend significant portions of time with the same 
research subjects, and thus I had to manage my relationship with various individuals to not 
only collect and create data, but gain new sources of information and opinions (Woodhams 
DQG'DQLHOLS1RUPDOO\WKLVSURFHVV LQYROYHV LGHQWLI\LQJD³JDWHNHHSHUZKRKDV
WKH DXWKRULW\«WR JUDQW IRUPDO HQWU\ WR WKH UHVHDUFK VLWH DQG UHVSRQGHQWV´ ibid, p.14). My 
official intern role meant that I had entry to the research site, and as I reported to the CSR 
GLUHFWRU,FRXOGXVHKLVDQGWKHFRPSDQ\¶V influence to obtain interviews and other sources 
of data. Through my time at Achilles I utilised third party referrals for information, allowing 
me access to interview participants, various company meetings, and published documents 
that were of potential benefit to my dissertation research. Furthermore I could make use of 
staff mHPEHUV¶JUHDWHUH[SHUWLVHDURXQGFHUWDLQLVVXHVWRFODULI\DQ\LVVXHVRUXQFHUWDLQWLHV,
encountered in other sources of data. 
 
4.3 Reflexivity and Ethics 
My role as both a student and intern during the dissertation period definitely influenced the 
research process and outcomes to both positive and negative degrees. As I took a non-covert 
approach, making clear my intent to undertake research alongside working as an intern, my 
subjects were all aware that I was indeed a student working on his dissertation. Thus there is 
DQHHGWREHUHIOH[LYHDV³>WKHUHVHDUFKHU¶V@SUHVHQFHLQZKDWHYHUIRUPZLOOKDYHVRPHNLQG
RI HIIHFW >RQ WKH VXEMHFW PDWWHU@´ $QGHUVRQ E S 7KLV LV HVSHFLDOO\ LPSRUWDQW
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given that accounts reflecting on access experience are rare (Woodhams and Danieli, 2008, 
p.15). My role as an intern was hugely beneficial in terms of access, as often people would 
view me as a member of staff and forget that I was also researching for my dissertation, and 
WKXV ZHUH ³PRUH FRQFHUQHG DERXW JHWWLQJ RQ ZLWK WKHLU MREV UDWKHU WKDQ EHLQJ REVHUYHG´
(Anderson, 2008a, p.151). This allowed me to study events in a more natural setting thereby 
increasing their accuracy. The overlap between my dissertation and placement project 
resulted in a collaborative natXUHWRWKHUHVHDUFKDQGWKLVOHGWRD³PRUHEDODQFHGUHODWLRQVKLS
EHWZHHQ UHVHDUFKHUV DQG WKRVH EHLQJ UHVHDUFKHG´ (DVWHUE\-Smith, 2008, p.44). The 
individuals and organisations I was studying for my dissertation were also benefitting from 
my work as an intern and as such were both collaborators and end-users of my research. I was 
consequently able to benefit from the generated goodwill and resultant access to wider 
complementary resources and expertise. In this sense a Romanticist stance was taken towards 
the research, as my internship role permitted me to establish rapport, trust and commitment 
(Alvesson and Svensson, 2008, p.119) with those I was researching, and I could subsequently 
obtain wider sources of data and deeper insights.  
 
However, my dual role also posed certain issues, particularly in terms of interviews. The act 
RILQWHUYLHZLQJHQWDLOVFHUWDLQ³SRZHUDQGVXEMHFWSRVLWLRQV´$OYHVVRQDQG6YHQVVRQ
p.120), and this manifested in the behaviour of some of the participants. As my interviews 
took place outside of my internship work, my student status appeared to become prominent 
GXULQJ WKLV SURFHVV 7KH GDWD SURGXFHG E\ LQWHUYLHZV ³KDYH WR EH VHHQ DV D SHUIRUPDQFH´
(Sims, 2008, p.117), and this resulted in elaborate explanations of simple terms I was already 
aware of, explanations of overall company policies that were not asked for, and tentative 
DQVZHUV WR PRUH LQYHVWLJDWLYH TXHVWLRQV 7KLV UHIOHFWV WKDW LQWHUYLHZHHV DUH ³DFWLYH KXPDQ
beings who are likely to have their own agenda for the coQYHUVDWLRQ´ibid, p.117), and this 
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compromised the quality of my data as my non-covert approach revealed that I was indeed a 
student. Collaborative research has also been attacked for a lack of objectivity, particularly by 
positivists who argue that research quality is undermined by a lack of researcher 
independence from what they are examining (Easterby-Smith, 2008, p.44). This issue should 
be acknowledged, because as my internship progressed I did become increasingly close to the 
people I was working with yet also trying to understand. This potentially compromised my 
objectivity, as I began to identify with them and see things from their perspective, which may 
not necessarily have been beneficial to the research at hand. Finally, my dual role throughout 
the process meant that I often had different objectives to the people I was working with when 
approaching a task, making collaboration a sometimes difficult task (ibid, p.44).  
 
The sensitive nature of the project between Achilles and the OECD meant that research ethics 
were an important factor when writing this dissertation, and resultantly I had to determine 
³ZKDW LVDSSURSULDWHDQGDFFHSWDEOH LQWKHFRQGXFWRIPDQDJHPHQWUHVHDUFK´ LQWKLVFRQWH[W
(Bell, 2008, p.87). This was particularly salient for this project because it involved ³KXPDQ
VXEMHFWV´ (ibid, p.88) who were members of wider and larger organisations, potentially 
putting their positions at risk should comments and actions be directly traceable to them. In 
addition to declaring my non-covert approach to research, verbal assurances were provided to 
all participants regarding the maintenance of privacy of subjects and anonymity and 
confidentiality of participation where possible. Consent was always obtained where 
appropriate. This dissertation will also not be made publicly available upon submission. I 
IXOO\DSSUHFLDWHWKDW³LWLVWKHUHVHDUFKHU¶VSULYLOHJHWRHQWHUDQGEHSDUWRI>SHRSOH¶VZRUNLQJ
OLYHV@´ $QGHUVRQ D S VR , KDYH WDNHQ HYHU\ QHFHVVDU\ SUHFDXWLRQ WR UHSD\ WKLV
respect by demonstrating that I have fully considered the research ethics implications of my 
study.  
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4.4 Research Limitations 
This project does suffer from certain research limitations, and these were mainly to do with 
the fact the Guidance had not been finalised at the time of researching and writing. The 
document is still currently undergoing revisions and updates, meaning that the majority of 
this dissertation is based on Guidance which is essentially still in draft form. As the Guidance 
has not been officially released, the OECD was reluctant to undergo any research not directly 
related to its official development, and resultantly I was not granted interviews with OECD 
staff. This represents a major limitation as the OECD was the convening body and could have 
contributed valuable data regarding the development process whilst complementing the 
opinions obtained from other interviewees from different sectors. The lack of primary data in 
this area places this dissertation at risk of appearing speculative, and subsequently every 
effort was made to obtain information from other sources to fill in the information gaps 
created by the lack of OECD participation.  
 
$V WKHGDWDFROOHFWLRQ LQYROYHGZRUNLQJRQD µOLYH¶SURMHFWGHOD\VRFFXUUHGWKURXJKRXW WKH
internship which subsequently delayed the research. Interviews may have been scheduled 
well in advance, but the importance of the Guidance and impending unveiling of them in 
September inevitably meant that events considered superfluous to the development of the 
document were of lower priority to those involved. This resulted in certain meetings and 
interviews being rescheduled or cancelled, negatively impacting the quantity and quality of 
data generated. Practical issues such as the internship taking place over the summer months 
meant that prospective interview subjects were also away on annual leave, whilst the 
geographic dispersal of those involved in the project sometimes meant that requests for 
clarification of certain issues and information were easily ignored or forgotten. Finally, 
$FKLOOHV¶ LQYROYHPHQW LV DOVR VWLOO \HW WR EH ILQDOLVHG PHDQLQJ WKDW(-TASC may not even 
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feature in the final Guidance document. This potentially undermines the validity of this study, 
as E-7$6&¶VSRWHQWLDOODFNRIUHIHUHQFHFRXOGUHQGHUODUJHSortions of this study irrelevant.  
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CHAPTER FIVE: THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO AND CONFLICT 
MINERALS 
 
5.1 Introduction 
µ'HYHORSLQJ FRXQWULHV¶ FDQ EH GHILQHG DV ³nations that have relatively lower per capita 
incomes and are relatively less industrialised´ 9LVVHU  S DQG LW LV KHUH WKDW WKH
effects of globalisation are often most visible. Their poorly developed regulatory structures 
mean that legal compliance has a lower priority than in the developed world, with CSR issues 
such as human rights not formalised within legislation (ibid, p.491). These absences 
contribute to the huge discrepancy between MNC profits and the prevalence of poverty in the 
countries where they operate (Dhanarajan, 2005, p.530). Legal systems where corporations 
are held accountable for their contribution to these situations have not been established 
(Montague, 2002, p.116) and subsequently CSR codes and standards are an important driver 
of CSR in developing countries (Visser, 2008, p.485). MNCs have been accused of abusing 
these regulatory vacuums to their financial benefit, with De Beers being targeted for profiting 
from the legal void left by civil wars in Africa (Scherer and Palazzo, 2008, p.424). Similar 
accusations are currently being levelled at the electronics industry for sourcing minerals from 
the DRC.  
 
In the 1980s, the consumer electronics market grew rapidly starting with the development of 
the personal computer (Gereffi et al., 2005, p.94), and continued technological advances 
since have increased world demand for minerals which are essential materials in electronic 
SURGXFWV0RQWDJXHS7KHWHUPµFRQIOLFWPLQHUDO¶WHQGVWRDSSO\WRWLQtantalum, 
tungsten, and gold (Prendergast and Lezhnev, 2009, p.1). In electronic goods, tin is used to 
solder components, tantalum acts as a coolant, tungsten is used to light screens, and gold is 
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used to coat wires (Kelley, 2010). It is estimated that the DRC accounts for 6-8% of the 
ZRUOG¶VWLQ-20% of its tantalum, 2-4% of its tungsten, and 1% of its gold (Enough, 2009, 
p.1). Mining in the DRC is mostly artisanal and informal, with over 2 million active miners 
and 12 million people (20% of the total population) being dependent on the mineral trade for 
their livelihoods (ITRI, 2009, p.5). Efforts to formalise the trade have been impeded by the 
involvement of military forces (Sullivan and Atama, 2010, p.4) in controlling the mines, and 
this interference has led to armed groups earning an estimated $185 million from the mineral 
trade in 2008 (Enough, 2009, p.3). TKLVH[SORLWDWLRQRIWKH'5&¶VQDWXUDOUHVRXUFHVDQGWKH
resulting illicit trade has exacerbated the conflict (UN, 2008, p.2).  
 
The social impact of the war has been devastating, resulting in the deaths of over 5 million 
people (CIA, 2010), the majority of whom have been civilians (Montague, 2002, p.103). 
Additionally, the warring parties have been responsible for human rights abuses such as 
torture and the recruitment of child soldiers (Global Witness, 2009, p.4). Armed groups are 
also the main perpetrator of sexual abuse (Sullivan and Atama, 2010, p.4), with there being 
7,500 reported cases of rape in the eastern part of the country alone in 2009 (Guardian, 2010). 
The presence of conflict has also deterred trade throughout the DRC (Blore and Smillie, 2010, 
p.2), and the government lacks any meaningful control over mineral-rich areas (Enough, 
2009, p.5). Various armed groups thus continue to profit from their access to minerals 
(Sullivan and Atama, 2010, p.1). 
 
Conflict minerals are both the origin and result of inadequate state authority in the DRC 
(Sullivan and Atama, 2010, p.1), allowing military bodies to flourish within this regulatory 
vacuum whilst FRPSRXQGLQJ WKH JRYHUQPHQW¶V LQDELOLW\ WR WDFNOH WKH SUREOHP RI Dccess. 
Consequently, any initiative which does not tackle the exploitation of mineral wealth is 
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unlikely to result in peace (Global Witness, 2009, p.8).  The DRC has been blessed with huge 
natural resources, but the challenge is to effectively manage their extraction to bring 
prosperity to the people (Enough, 2009, p.3). With Asian exports of similar resources 
reducing in quantity and quality, African minerals are of long term strategic importance 
(Hayes and Burge, 2003, p.39), especially given the insatiable global appetite for electronic 
products (Mantz, 2008, p.37). The widespread everyday use of electronic goods renders a 
consumer boycott impractical (Kelley, 2010), whilst the electronics industry has spent about 
US$2 million a month lobbying the US Senate to relax legislation on mineral transparency 
(Prendergast and Lezhnev, 2009, p.1), thereby limiting the avenues available to halt the 
conflict mineral issue. Within this environment, armed groups undermining Congolese state 
authority can continue to exist and profit (Montague, 2002, p.115).  
 
Nevertheless, the mining industry remains an invaluable opportunity for the DRC to create a 
VXVWDLQDEOH HFRQRP\ DQG VRFLHW\ 0DQW]  S 7KHUH KDV EHHQ ³DQ XQSUHFHGHQWHG
VXUJH LQ LQWHUQDWLRQDO  DWWHQWLRQ´ 6ullivan and Atama, 2010, p.9) on the conflict mineral 
issue, representing a chance to mobilise the Congolese government, the international 
community, MNCs, and global civil society to release WKH '5&¶V PLQHUDO VHFWRU from the 
hands of armed groups and bring it under state control. Not only would this represent a blow 
to the finances of rogue military bodies, it would also allow the benefits of the mineral trade 
to accrue to the DRC and its population. However, the informal nature and sheer complexity 
of the mineral supply chain make this a difficult task.  
 
5.2 The Mineral Supply Chain 
Figure 3 shows a map of the '5&¶V mineral supply chain, and there are significant risks of 
corruption, smuggling, and human rights abuses occurring at every stage. Bringing 
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transparency to this supply chain has been touted as the most effective way to ensure that the 
'5&¶V PLQHUDO ZHDOWK GRHV QRW HQG XS IXQGLQJ DUPHG JURXSV 3UHQGergast and Lezhnev, 
2009, p.1). 
 
Figure 3: The Mineral Supply Chain 
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workers to over 2,000 (Enough, 2009, p.3). An estimated 50% of the 200 mines in eastern 
Congo are controlled by armed groups, with 12 of the largest 13 mines under rogue military 
control (Prendergast and Lezhnev, 2009, p.2). Working conditions in DRC mines are 
particularly poor, with widespread child labour, frequent deadly accidents, and workers 
earning between US$1 and US$5 a day (ibid, 2009, p.2). Miners are intimidated and 
exploited by regional militias and even government troops (Sullivan and Atama, 2010, p.4), 
underlining the lawlessness and corruption prevalent in Congolese mining. Furthermore, 
because WKH '5&¶V minerals can be simply surface-mined, artisanal mining has had a 
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Transporters 
90% of mineral transporters, who move the materials from the mines, operate illegally 
(Prendergast and Lezhnev, 2009, p.3), with the majority of transport controlled by armed 
groups (ibid, p.4). The few transporters who operate out of the direct control of militias have 
to pay bribes and taxes (Enough, 2009, p.4). Thus the mineral transport business generated 
armed groups US$75 million in 2008 (Prendergast and Lezhnev, 2009, p.4). 
 
Trading Houses 
7KHPLQHUDOVDUHSXUFKDVHGLQWUDGLQJKXEVE\LQGLYLGXDOVFDOOHGµQHJRFLDQWV¶ZKRWKHQEULQJ
them to trading houses to be sorted. These houses have no monitoring system in place for the 
source of their minerals (Global Witness, 2009, p.7), and often misreport their sources to 
DYRLGWKH³WDLQW´DVVRFLDWHGZLWKFRQIOLFWPLQHUDOV(QRXJKS 
 
Export Companies 
([SRUW FRPSDQLHV RU ³FRPSWRLUV´ SXUFKDVH WKH Pinerals from trading houses and process 
them to sell onto foreign buyers. The only method exporters use to ascertain the source of 
minerals is verbal assurance, and there is rarely a case where an exporter refuses a batch of 
minerals for fear of being implicit in conflict financing (ibid, p.4). This, and the lack of 
enforcement of the laws forbidding comptoirs from purchasing minerals from unregistered 
traders (ibid, p.4), allows conflict minerals to enter the next stage of the supply chain. Finally, 
comptoirs have the incentive to underreport or smuggle their export minerals because export 
taxes are much higher in the DRC than in neighbouring countries (Enough, 2009, p.5).  
 
Neighbouring Countries 
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The exporters then send the minerals to neighbouring countries. Whilst some are legally 
exported, paying the correct taxes to the DRC government, statistical inconsistencies reveal 
the huge extent of smuggling that happens. For example, Uganda produced less than $600 
worth of gold in 2007, yet exported $74 million worth (Prendergast and Lezhnev, 2009, p.5). 
This may coincide with the reported figures that the DRC legally exported 270 pounds of 
gold in 2007 out of 11,000 pounds produced (ibid, p.4), underlining the sheer volume of 
profit that does not accrue to the DRC itself. Bribes are also easily exacted at border controls 
(Enough, 2009, p.4).  
 
Smelters 
The minerals are then refined into metals to be put onto the world market and this is done by 
chemical processing companies, or smelters. These are often large companies based in East 
Asia, with there being ten companLHV SURFHVVLQJ RYHU  RI WKH ZRUOG¶V WLQ DQG IRXU
companies comprising the majority of the tantalum processing market (Prendergast and 
Lezhnev, 2009, p.6). Tin smelters in particular have been cited by the UN for purchasing 
minerals from militarised mines in the DRC (Howard, 2010), and it appears that smelters may 
GHSHQGPRUHRQ&RQJR¶VPLQHUDOVWKDQWKH\DGPLW6XOOLYDQDQG$WDPDS7KLVLV
subsequently a critical link in the supply chain, as minerals from the Congo are mixed with 
minerals from other sources, causing them to lose their individual identity (ITRI, 2009, p.6). 
This inhibits the possibility of tracing the tracing the metals back to their source (EICC, 2009, 
p.2).  
 
Electronics Companies 
Finally the smelters sell the minerals to electronics companies, who are the largest consumers 
RI WKH '5&¶V PLQHUDOV %\ WKLV stage, the PLQHUDOV¶ provenance is virtually impossible to 
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establish (ITRI, 2009, p.6), with private companies not mandated by law to produce public 
records of their mineral sourcing. Demand for these minerals is likely to continue to grow, 
PDNLQJWKH'5&¶VVRXUFHVFULWLFDO LQPDLQWDLQLQJOHYHOVRIVXSSO\+D\HVDQG%XUJH
p.11). The DRC is also likely to remain an attractive source for purchasing minerals because 
of their relative cheapness, a result of the poor conditions in which hey are produced (Enough, 
2009, p.9). NGOs have consequently accused the IT industry of funding conflict, criticising 
them for pleading ignorance and not implementing systems which could combat the usage of 
these minerals (Global Witness, 2009, p.7). However, it can be seen that the industry depends 
on a long and complex supply chain, meaning that end users are hugely distant from mineral 
suppliers (EICC, 2009, p.2). Moreover, when an electronics company buys minerals, they are 
likely to contain mixed ores making it impossible to guarantee its source (Blore and Smillie, 
2010, p.36). Steve Jobs, CEO of Apple, has resultantly commented that ³WKHUHLVQRZD\«WR
EHVXUH´LIFRPSDQLHVDUHXVLQJFRQIOLct free materials (Howard, 2010).  
 
Sadly, the DRC lacks a viable legal framework for mining that is legitimate (Enough, 2009, 
p.3) let alone the artisanal production that prevails in conflict areas. Where legislation does 
exist, it is minimal and poorly eQIRUFHGZLWKWKH LQKHUHQW³FOLPDWHRI UHSUHVVLRQ´GHWHUULQJ
any whistleblowers (Prendergast and Lezhnev, 2009, p.5). This lack of formalisation of the 
trade allows armed groups to extort money at various stages of the supply chain (ITRI, 2009, 
p.5). What HQVXHVLVDV\VWHPZKHUHWUDGHLVFKDUDFWHULVHGE\³EDFNGRRUGHDOV´0DQW]
SDQG³XQGRFXPHQWHGDQGXQWD[HGPLQHUDO IORZV´%ORUHDQG6PLOOLHS7KXV
as electronics companies have argued (Prendergast and Lezhnev, 2009, p.1) the mineral 
VXSSO\ FKDLQ DSSHDUV WRR FRPSOH[ WR HQVXUH SURGXFWV DUH LQGHHG µFRQIOLFW IUHH¶ The EICC 
have stated that mineral purchasing that fuels conflict is unacceptable (EICC, 2009, p.2), but 
the absence of any certification process and mandatory legislation governing the trade makes 
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it almost impossible for them to do anything about that belief. Whilst the industry could 
choose to simply boycott minerals from the DRC, the consequences could be as devastating 
to the Congolese population as the conflict. Not only would it destroy what legitimate mining 
that does exist but it would increase overall poverty and potentially escalate the conflict as 
warring parties may struggle to secure any sources of financing that might remain (Hayes and 
Burge, 2003, p.38). Should MNCs walk away from the DRC, the millions of Congolese that 
depend on the mineral trade would be plunged into hardship, with an increased likelihood of 
crime, violence, and mortality. 
 
5.3 Conclusion 
The UN Security Council acknowledge that the DRC government has a responsibility to 
ensure security and protect its civilians (UN, 2008, p.1), and this reflects the pressing need to 
develop Congolese state authority. If armed groups continue to prosper, peace cannot ensue, 
and subsequently there is a wide consensus that the DRC need to develop security forces to 
protect its population and strengthen its government (Sullivan and Atama, 2010, p.6). Foreign 
government interest in the DRC continues to intensify with the United Kingdom (UK) 
committing £130 million towards stability in the Congo (Guardian, 2010). However, NGOs 
lament that the vast sums donated fail to address the issue of access to natural resources 
(Global Witness, 2009, p.8). Past initiatives have ultimately been unable to sufficiently alter 
the existing trading conditions and prevent the undermining of state authority (Enough, 2009, 
p.5). A DRC Mining Code does exist in accordance with international standards, but this is 
simply disregarded (Enough, 2009, p.5). This reflects that the Congolese state is simply too 
weak at present to enforce regulation in the sector, and consequently external assistance will 
be needed to address the issue. 
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However, other governments have done very little to halt the trade (Karlsson, 2010), 
particularly in terms of holding companies based in their countries accountable for engaging 
in the mineral trade (Global Witness, 2009, p.8). Yet there are signs that this is changing. In 
2008, Afrimex was prosecuted by the UK government for purchasing conflict minerals from 
a rebel group and subsequently contributing to the conflict (NCP, 2008). Meanwhile in the 
USA, a Conflict Minerals Trade Act is passing through Congress which will require the USA 
government to map out all the '5&¶V mines and identify which ones are controlled by 
militias (Foden-Vencil, 2010). Congress is also debating various proposals that would 
effectively end the importation of conflict minerals (Murray, 2010). These initiatives recently 
received a boost with the latest financial regulation bill including a provision that requires US 
companies to publicly disclose the measures they are taking to ensure that their products do 
not contain conflict minerals from the DRC (Sheridan, 2010). The European Union is also 
facing increased pressure to also begin a process to combat conflict minerals (Karlsson, 2010), 
reflecting the growing international campaign to end the conflict and its resulting atrocities 
(Kelley, 2010). The G8 have expressed their concerns about mineral trade exploitation in the 
DRC, whilst the UN Security Council has recently passed a resolution that permits asset 
freezes and travel bans on companies guilty of supporting armed groups in the DRC 
(Karlsson, 2010). There is subsequently intense international media, civil and political 
attention on the DRC and its mineral sector.  
 
Whilst companies are being vilified for utilising conflict minerals, ensuring conflict free 
VRXUFHV E\ UHIXVLQJ WR EX\ WKH '5&¶V RUHV ZRXOG ³FRQVWLWXWH DQ DEGLFDWLRQ RI FRUSRUDWH
UHVSRQVLELOLW\´+D\HVDQG%XUJHS-XVWEHFDXVHFRPSDQLHVLQWRGD\¶VJOREDOLVHG
economy outsource business operations such as mineral extraction does not mean that they 
also outsource the risk or responsibilities for how activities are carried out further up the 
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supply chain (UNGC, 2010, p.7). Subsequently, the 2002 UN Panel of Experts concluded that 
³WKHPRVWLPSRUWDQWHOHPHQWLQHIIHFWLYHO\KDOWLQJWKHLOOHJDOH[SORLWDWLRQRIUHVRXUFHVLQWKH
DRC relates to the political will of those who support, protect, and benefit from the 
QHWZRUNV´ (Enough, 2009, p.6), directly implying responsibilities of MNCs. The increase in 
international attention, UN pledges to support the DRC and the 2008 decision of metals giant 
Traxys to suspend purchasing from the DRC DSSHDUV³WRKDYH UDWWOHG«DFWRUV LQ WKH VXSSO\
cKDLQ DQG KDV VSDUNHG HIIRUWV WR GHYHORS KLJKHU VWDQGDUGV RI GXH GLOLJHQFH´ 6XOOLYDQ DQG
Atama, 2010, p.8). Initiatives in this area stand to EULQJWUDQVSDUHQF\WRWKHVXSSO\FKDLQ³DQ
LPSRUWDQW ILUVW VWHS´ (QRXJK  S LQ WXUQLQJ WKH '5&¶V PLQHUDls from a source of 
conflict to one of national prosperity and empowerment. 
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CHAPTER SIX: THE GUIDANCE DEVELOPMENT PROCESS 
 
6.1 Introduction 
7KH KHLJKWHQHG LQWHUHVW LQ HVWDEOLVKLQJ D ³FOHDQ VWUHDP´ /D0RQLFD RI PLQHUDOV has 
invigorated attempts to establish a conflict-free supply chain (Sullivan and Atama, 2010), and 
the OECD have drafted Guidance for companies to contribute to this process. The Guidance 
QRW RQO\ ³GHILQHs risk-based due diligence for companies throughout the entire mineral 
supply chain to detect and manage risks of directly or indirectly supporting conflict through 
the extraction and trade of minerals from conflict-DIIHFWHG DUHDV´ EXW DOVR DLPV WR KHOS
companies address other non-conflict specific risks such as mining conditions, bribery, and 
corruption (OECD, 2010a, p.3). This reflects a consensus at both NGO (Sullivan and Atama, 
2010, p.5) and industry (ITRI, 2009, p.5) levels that improved levels of due diligence is the 
appropriate method of progressing on the conflict mineral issue.  
 
International CoCs ³encompass guidelines, recommendations or rules issued by entities 
within society with the intent to affect the behaviour of business entities within society in 
order to enhance corporate responsibility´ (Kolk and van Tulder, 2005, p.3). In this case the 
OECD are releasing the Guidance to influence the way companies are sourcing minerals, thus 
promoting sustainable outcomes in conflict areas such as the DRC. Due diligence can be 
GHILQHGDV³WKHVWHSVWDNHQWRGHWHFWULVN´7D\ORUHWDOS,QWKLVFRQWH[WWKHULVN
for companies is supporting conflict or implicitly contributing to negative occurrences such 
as poor working conditions and corruption through their relationships with suppliers. The due 
diligence process subsequently LQFOXGHV ³UHVHDUFKLQJ SRWHQWLDO DVVRFLDWHV DQG HPSOR\HHV LQ
RUGHU WR LGHQWLI\ DQG GHDO ZLWK HWKLFDO ULVNV RU DUHDV RI XQFHUWDLQW\´ DQG ³LQWHJULW\
PDQDJHPHQWRIWKHRQJRLQJEXVLQHVVUHODWLRQVKLS´2*3S 
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6.2 The Multi-stakeholder Development Process 
The senior member of GeSI states that the Guidance process was initiated by the OECD 
asking GeSI which issues they wanted the Guidelines to address, and an initial draft 
document was produced from this. Multi-stakeholder participation in a GeSI working group 
then identified the key challenges regarding due diligence around the social and 
environmental impacts of the mineral supply chain and developed solutions, resulting in the 
Draft Guidelines that exist presently (OECD, 2010b). The draft was then commented on by a 
Mining and Minerals research group of academics, whose feedback is currently being 
incorporated into a new revision of the Guidelines which will be presented at an OECD-
ICGLR conference in September. A handful of companies will then participate in an 
implementation testing phase for one year, and then another revision of the Guidance will 
take place before being dispersed among wider industry.  
 
Using Mitchell et al.¶VVWDNHKROGHUVDOLHQFHPRGHOWKHIRllowing analysis will attempt 
to uncover the contribution various parties make to the development of international CoCs 
and understand why they were involved in their varying degrees. A stakeholder can be 
GHILQHGDV³JURXSVDQGLQGLYLGXDOVZKRFDQDIIHFWor are affected by, the achievement of an 
RUJDQLVDWLRQ¶V PLVVLRQ´ (Freeman, 1984, p.111). $ VWDNHKROGHU¶V VDOLHQFH LV ³WKH GHJUHH WR
ZKLFK PDQDJHUV JLYH SULRULW\ WR FRPSHWLQJ VWDNHKROGHU FODLPV´ $JOH HW DO  S
0LWFKHOO HW DO¶V model argues thDW D VWDNHKROGHU¶V VDOLHQFH WR D ILUP UHJDUGLQJ D SDUWLFXODU
LVVXHGHSHQGVRQWKUHHIDFWRUV7KHILUVWDWWULEXWHLVWKHVWDNHKROGHU¶Vpower to influence the 
firm. This depends on their access to normative ± e.g. negative publicity and protests, 
utilitarian ± e.g. boycotts and lawsuits, and coercive ± e.g. sanctions - means to impose their 
will on companies (Maignan et al, 2002, p.644). The second attribute is the legitimacy of the 
VWDNHKROGHU¶VFODLP on the firm ZKLFKLV³EDVHGXSRQIRUH[DPSOHFRQWUDFWexchange, legal 
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title, legal right, moral right, at-ULVNVWDWXVRUPRUDOLQWHUHVW«>LQ@FRPSDQ\DFWLRQ´$JOHHW
al., 1999, p.508). The final attribute is the urgency RI WKH VWDNHKROGHU¶V FODLP RQ WKH
corporation, the degree to which stakeholder claims call for immediate attention (Mitchell et 
al., 1997, p.867).  
 
The OECD 
Firstly, the heavy involvement of the OECD reflects its possession of all three of the 
aforementioned attributes on companies and the mineral issue. Whilst it could be argued that 
there no adequately strong global governance institutions in existence (Scherer and Palazzo, 
2008, p.423), the academic argues that no institution has a broader net than the OECD, 
reflecting its power to influence both global issues and corporations. $FKLOOHV¶ 'irector 
IXUWKHUUHIHUVWRWKHPDV³DQRUPDWLYHERG\VHWWLQJH[SHFWDWLRQVDQGVWDQGDUGV´Its influence 
in this area allows them to exert coercive power over companies through their ability to 
influence legislation, especially given that the majority of MNCs originate from OECD 
economies (Van Tulder, 2006, p.47).  
 
7KH 2(&'¶V OHJLWLPDF\ VRPHZKDW GHULYHV IURP WKHLU SRZHU DV DOO LQWHUYLHZ SDUWLFLSDQWV
agreed that they are a credible organisation that can galvanise and influence various actors 
within the mineral supply chain. International institutions are increasingly being called upon 
to facilitate discourse around global issues (Scherer et al., 2006, p.522), and the academic 
remarked that it does need a convening authority to facilitate discussion surrounding a 
particular issue between different parties, given them a moral interest in company action. All 
interviewees remarked on the widespread appreciation of the political legitimacy the OECD 
bring to the issue, and resultantly their claims on corporations and the issue of conflict 
minerals is highly legitimate.   
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The OECD is also an urgent stakeholder due to the criticality of their relationship with 
corporations, and this is reflected not only in the importance attached to the relationship by 
the OECD, but also the importance attached to the relationship by businesses. Underlining its 
possession of legitimacy, the senior academic acknowledged that OECD involvement 
provides a mandate for companies to implement due diligence guidelines, and this is of huge 
benefit as operating under the Guidance would be acceptable for any future contract and 
remove a huge amount of risk in this area from a business relationship. On the other hand, the 
OECD also needs to maintain the relationship they have with businesses, otherwise the 
Guidelines would not be implemented and the mineral issue would not be tackled.  
 
Industry associations 
Corporations and other industry members within the supply chain will want representation in 
the development process, and this has been through the involvement of associations 
representing the electronics industry, traders, and metal processors (OECD, 2010b). Such 
business associations are inter-firm instruments of cooperation which help to develop 
proposals for industry-wide action (Albareda, 2008, p.443). As a result, business associations 
do exert power over individual corporations as they are responsible for dispersing industry 
best practice and influencing behaviour. Furthermore, if a member of an association does not 
comply with the practice set out, their membership can be terminated, posing a potential 
sanction to misbehaviour.  
 
Industry association legitimacy derives from their role as representatives of large numbers of 
individual private actors, and from a practical perspective, companies will want industry-
wide rather than individual representation. Given that the implementation of the Guidance 
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will be undertaken by companies, industry association legitimacy regarding the conflict 
mineral issue is further strengthened as successful implementation will be determined by 
individual corporations. $FKLOOHV¶ 'LUHFWRU states that GeSI bring a practical perspective to 
proceedings about what is implementable, and this reinforces their overall legitimacy 
regarding mineral due diligence. The fact that the OECD initially consulted GeSI about what 
the Guidance should contain underlines this. 
 
Both corporate interviewees stressed that they are being criticised for doing little to combat 
the usage of conflict minerals, which has presented risk in terms of brand and reputation.  
Industry associations are thus urgent stakeholders as they represent the interests of individual 
corporations who are suffering negative publicity and want clearer guidance with which they 
can demonstrate they are executing recognised due diligence.  
 
NGOs  
NGO involvement in the production of the Guidelines reflects their readily accessible means 
to normative and utilitarian power over corporations. NGO concerns often provide an initial 
impetus for CSR efforts (Bendell, 2005, p.370). This was the case with conflict minerals, as 
the corporate director admits that his company only became aware of conflict minerals when 
an campaign led by NGO µ7KH &HQWUH IRU 5HVHDUFK RQ 0XOWLQDWLRQDO &RUSRUDWLRQV¶ called 
³0DNH,7)DLU´ZDVODXQFKHG%oth academics also stated the importance of NGO activity in 
conflict areas as a reason for companies seeking solutions to their minerals supply chain 
issues. As the DFDGHPLFUHPDUNHG³\RXFDQ¶WNHHSSUREOHPVDZD\IURP1*2V´ 
 
The claims of NGOs are legitimate as they represent the interests of miners and others who 
are at risk due to the trade. As we shall see later, these groups are poorly represented in the 
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development process, and thus the legitimacy of NGOs becomes more important as they are 
the only outlet through which miners can influence the process. $FKLOOHV¶'LUHFWRU remarks 
that NGOs legitimacy is further enhanced through their ability to accurately report conditions 
on the ground.  
 
NGO claims in this case are urgent as they do call for immediate attention. NGO Enough  
(2009, p.9) have called for more campaigns to focus on visible brands as they allow for much 
wider public exposure, and hence companies need to manage this relationship. CSR often 
stems from the reputational risk posed by the influence of NGOs (Bendell, 2005, p.370), and 
ERWK FRUSRUDWH LQWHUYLHZHHV UHFRJQLVH WKH LPSRUWDQFH RI WKHVH VWDNHKROGHUV¶ DFWLRQV LQ
stimulating corporate action over this issue.  
 
Civil Society Groups 
Civil society groups have been involved in the working group, reflecting their salience 
regarding the issue. In a similar manner to NGOs, civil society actors have been a catalyst for 
corporations taking action regarding conflict minerals, highlighting their possession of 
normative and utilitarian means to impose their will on companies. The working group 
participant ODPHQWV WKDW ³DQ\ LQYHVWLJDWLYH MRXUQDOLVW ZRUWK KLV VDOW´ FDQ GLVFRYHU FRUSRUDWH
malpractice around conflict minerals, and any transgressors of the Guidance would 
resultantly find themselves under intense scrutiny, underlining the potential for normative 
influence over corporations. Similarly, media coverage has focused on the highest profile 
users of minerals (Hayes and Burge, 2003, p.11), and the corporate manager acknowledges 
that KLVFRPSDQ\¶V awareness of conflict minerals started in 2001 after journalists confronted 
the electronics industry about their indirect contribution to the conflict in the DRC (ibid, 
p.13).  
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Civil society groups are legitimate stakeholders, as through purchasing electronics goods they 
are contributing to the economic wellbeing of MNCs, WKH'5&¶V PLQHUVDQG WKHDVVRFLDWHG
externalities of their production. Consumers today, particularly in OECD economies, are 
educated and articulate with considerable spending power (Van Tulder, 2006, p.63), and both 
corporate interviewees agreed that this mass of people can easily be galvanised to campaign 
and influence the activities of corporations. Resultantly, NGOs have highlighted the role 
consumers and citizens have to play in transforming the mineral supply chain (Enough, 2009, 
p.1)  
 
The corporate manager remarks that there has been a huge increase in consumerism around 
electronic products and that there is a building pressure and awareness from consumer groups 
which companies cannot ignore. Communications outlets such as the internet are forcing 
greater corporate transparency (Scherer and Palazzo, 2008, p.425), and therefore the claims 
of civil society are indeed urgent and worthy of corporate attention.   
 
Academics 
Academics were invited to comment upon the draft Guidance but were not actually involved 
in its creation, underlining their lack of overall salience with regards to corporations and 
conflict minerals. This stakeholder group do not really possess any power to impose their will 
upon corporations. Although they could normatively influence companies through 
publications, both academic interviewees DFNQRZOHGJHGWKDWWKHLUYLHZVRILVVXHVRIWHQ³RQO\
FDSWXUHWKHSHUVSHFWLYHRIDQLGHDOZRUOG´DQG³FDQQRWFRQIURQWSUDFWLFDOUHDOLWLHV´ 
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Both corporate interviewees acknowledged the legitimacy of academic involvement on the 
issue, as they offer credibility to the final Guidance. This derives from their ability to access 
and carry out necessary research that will positively impact the usefulness of the output and 
from the different viewpoint that they bring, which can often cut through political and 
practical considerations and isolate key considerations. The academics involved also 
possessed expert knowledge of certain topics pertinent to the conflict mineral issue, ranging 
from experience in outlining corporate best practice regarding social and environmental 
impacts to extensive exposure to the development and application of CoCs in Africa.  
 
Ultimately, academics claims on corporations are not urgent. Whilst useful as input to 
Guidance revisions, their claims on corporations regarding conflict minerals do not really call 
for immediate attention. This overall lack of salience is reflected by the fact that both the 
OECD and GeSI did not intend for academics to participate at all in the development of the 
Guidance. It was only when Achilles mentioned their link to the research group that they 
were touted as a potential source for comments on the draft Guidelines.  
 
Miners 
Arguably the most legitimate stakeholders in the mineral supply chain are the miners 
themselves, as it is their livelihoods that stand to be transformed by the Guidance and their 
rights that continue to be violated through the mineral trade. Furthermore, the dire situation 
faced by miners and the degree to which they ultimately depend on international trade to 
make a living renders their claims on corporations highly urgent. However, one of the co-
FKDLUVRI*H6,DGPLWVWKDW³PLQHUVKDYHQRWEHHQZHOOUHSUHVHQWHGDWDOO´ 
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This is possibly due to the fact that in terms of power, miners have little to none. Both co-
chairs of GeSI concede that the minerals in question can easily be sourced from countries 
other than the DRC, and therefore miners remain at the mercy of those who purchase their 
minerals. Furthermore, the informal nature of their trade and lack of literacy means that they 
have no real means of pressuring MNCs and making their concerns heard. Thus the closest 
that miners are to being represented in the development of the Guidance is through the 
participation of Southern academics, NGOs, and traders who are members of industry 
associations.  
 
)LJXUH  LV 0LWFKHOO HW DO¶V  S VWDNHKROGHU W\SRORJ\ GLDJUDP ZKLFK FODVVLILHV
stakeholders according to which attributes they possess.  
 
Figure 4: Stakeholder Typology Diagram 
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Meanwhile, Figure 5 summarises which attributes each stakeholder possesses regarding 
companies and the issue of conflict minerals, and their subsequent stakeholder classification 
according to the diagram above: 
 
Figure 5: Table of stakeholder attributes 
 
Figure 5 demonstrates that the stakeholders fully involved in the development of the 
Guidance possess all three attributeV DQG DUH WKXV µGHILQLWLYH¶ VWDNHKROGHUV &RQVHTXHQWO\
FRPSDQLHV³KDYHDFOHDUDQGLPPHGLDWHPDQGDWHWRDWWHQGWR«WKDWVWDNHKROGHU¶VFODLP´ibid, 
p.878). Whilst academics do possess legitimacy, their lack of power and urgency resulted in 
them only commenting on the Guidelines rather than being part of the broader development 
SURFHVV 7KH\ DUH D µGLVFUHWLRQDU\ VWDNHKROGHU¶ PHDQLQJ WKDW EXVLQHVVHV KDYH ³QR
SUHVVXUH«WR HQJDJH LQ DQ DFWLYH UHODWLRQVKLS´ ibid, p.875) with them. This status is 
underlined by the OECD and GeSI not initially including them in the development process. 
0HDQZKLOHWKH ODFNRI LQYROYHPHQWRIDFWXDOPLQHUVXQGHUOLQHVWKHLUVWDWXVDVDµGHSHQGHQW
VWDNHKROGHU¶PHDQLQJWKDWWKH\³GHSHQGRQRWKHUVIor the power necessary to carry out their 
ZLOO´ ibid, p.877). $FKLOOHV¶ 'LUHFWRU thus acknowledges that NGOs are closest to 
representing them, and miners resultantly have to rely on a third party for advancing their 
interests on their issue.  
 Power Legitimacy Urgency Class 
The OECD 9 9 9 Definitive 
Industry Associations 9 9 9 Definitive 
NGOs 9 9 9 Definitive 
Civil Society Groups 9 9 9 Definitive 
Academics  9  Discretionary 
Miners  9 9 Dependent 
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6.3 Conclusion 
This analysis has shown that whilst a multi-stakeholder process has been utilised in the 
creation of the Guidance, stakeholder involvement has been varied. This raises questions 
DERXWWKHFRQWHQWRIWKHGRFXPHQWDV LWLV³QRWDOZD\VFOHDUWKHPXOWL-stakeholder standards 
are truly multi-stakeholder LQ WKHLU RSHUDWLRQV´ Fransen and Kolk, 2007, p.679). GeSI 
initially provided the OECD with ideas of what the Guidance should contain risking the 
incorporation of a potentially insincere industry commitment. FXUWKHUPRUH *H6,¶V
membership comprises of mainly large and visible electronics MNCs meaning that CSR may 
continue to be only practiced by leaders rather than industry as a whole. Whilst NGOs and 
civil society appear to have been integral in pressuring corporations to act, there are still 
questions over whether they can adequately monitor changing corporate behaviour resulting 
from the Guidance. Consequently, issues arising from the literature review such as the 
credibility of corporate involvement, the voluntary nature of CoCs, and the efficacy of actors 
monitoring the CoC remain.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN: THE GUIDANCE CONTENT 
 
7.1 Introduction 
The Guidance (OECD, 2010a) outlines 5 main steps companies should take in exercising due 
diligence: 
1. Strengthen company management systems 
2. Identify and assess risks in the supply chain 
3. Design and implement a strategy to respond to identified risks 
4. Ensure an independent third-SDUW\DXGLWRIVPHOWHUV¶GXHGLOLJHQFHSUDFWLFHV 
5. Publish an annual report on supply chain due diligence 
 
This chapter consequently examines the content of the Guidance to identify how multi-
stakeholder involvement affected it, the ways it addresses the limitations traditionally 
associated with CoCs in the literature, and how it tackles certain challenges regarding the 
conflict mineral issue outlined by various organisations.  
 
7.2 Multi-stakeholder input 
The senior academic acknowledged a wide consultation process has been attempted in 
developing the Guidance, and a multi-stakeholder approach to CoC development brings 
certain benefits that elevate it above ordinary codes. As various stakeholder groups can bring 
different understandings of sustainability challenges (UNGC, 2010, p.54), their involvement 
potentially enhances the effectiveness of policies and strategies (Van Tulder, 2006, p.362). 
This is especially true of codes aimed at the developing world and supply chain management 
(Bondy et al., 2007, p.437). The previous chapter showed how each actor possesses different 
qualities which in turn influenced their degree of participation in the development of the 
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Guidance, and the working group participant believes that this approach was ³WKHRQO\ZD\WR
get a credible a solution that is respected by all of the different SOD\HUV´:KLOVW WKH2ECD 
brought its political clout and convening power, NGOs brought greater knowledge of 
conditions on the ground and academics contributed their empirical knowledge of CoCs and 
wider relevant issues. Interviewees from all groups recognised that companies provided the 
pragmatism. For example, the senior member of GeSI stated that NGOs wanted due diligence 
all the way down to the mines, but industry representatives knew that this was not feasible, 
and hence the Guidance recommends due diligence down to smelter level. This reflects the 
lack of involvement of miners in the development process, as the Guidance does not 
explicitly aim to influence actors beyond the smelter level in the mineral supply chain. The 
academics underlined that the OECD had to be sensitive to practical considerations whilst not 
overtly compromising the requirements placed on companies, and the multi-stakeholder 
approach to development meant that such issues could be navigated and negotiated between 
various members. The resulting strategy is therefore of greater legitimacy, overall consensus 
and democratic content (Van Tulder, 2006, p.361).  
 
7.3 Supply Chain Approach 
The literature on CoCs laments the fact that codes have traditionally failed to take a supply 
chain approach to issues (Kolk and van Tulder, 2005, p.15). As the Guidance sets out 
principles for responsible supply chain management, this conventional limitation is 
immediately overcome. Furthermore, codes have tended to suffer from vague principles and 
broad commitments which are interpreted differently by various stakeholders (Bondy et al., 
2007, p.444). However, the supply chain approach to conflict minerals taken by the 
Guidelines means that the code LVDOVRDGGUHVVLQJDFRPSDQ\¶VEXVLQHVVSDUWQHUVUHIOHFWLQJ
greater focus than traditional CoCs (Kolk et al., 1999, p.160). Furthermore, the involvement 
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of, and continuing dialogue between different stakeholders means that understanding of the 
Guidance is unlikely to vary between parties. Whilst tools for defining corporate best practice 
such as the OECD Guidelines for MNEs are already in existence, they have proved to be 
overwhelmingly broad (Fransen and Kolk, 2007, p.169). As a result WKH *XLGDQFH¶V focus 
offers a greater clarity than previously observed in corporate CoCs, and the multi-stakeholder 
approach contributes to its shared understanding between different participants. 
 
The Guidance recommends that companies make the defined requirements contractual with 
their suppliers, underlining a growing recognition within industry and academia that lead 
companies are increasingly involving themselves in the operations of suppliers. This is 
enhancing their ability to influence supplier behaviour in regards to CSR performance 
0LOOLQJWRQ  S 7KLV DSSURDFK UHIOHFWV ³SRZHU-dependHQF\´ WKHRU\ ZKLFK VWDWHV
WKDW³SRZHUUHVLGHVLQWKHDELOLW\RIRQHSDUW\WRPDNHDQRWKHUGRZKDWWKH\RWKHUZLVHPLJKW
QRWKDYHGRQH´ibid, p.372). In this case, users of minerals hold power over their suppliers 
due to the sheer volume of purchases they make and the ease with which they can access 
minerals elsewhere, meaning that suppliers are YXOQHUDEOHWREX\HUV¶LQIOXHQFH. NGOs, whilst 
appreciating that electronics companies have recognised the greater need for due diligence, 
have criticised companies for not performing checks throughout their supply chain (Global 
Witness, 2009, p.7). The corporate manager concedes that traditional company policy is to 
only interface with their first tier suppliers, indicating that corporations currently only look to 
directly influence one step along the supply chain. However, the Guidance stipulates that 
companies should trace their mineral supply chain all the way down to their smelters, which 
the OECD says could be more than 5 levels down. By aiming to extend the degree to which 
MNCs influence their suppliers, the OECD has recognised the latent power of mineral end 
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users to pressure other seemingly distant supply chain actors, and mobilised them to 
potentially bring greater transparency.  
 
Yet CSR initiatives in MNC supply chains often squeeze out smaller enterprises because they 
find it harder to bear the costs of additional requirements (Utting, 2002, p.98), and the 
Guidelines do run this risk. The senior academic states that for many large companies, the 
Guidelines will not require too much tangible change in procedures as they will already have 
systems to implement the *XLGDQFH¶VUHFRPPHQGDWLRQVThe first three steps of the Guidance 
in particular require considerable internal capabilities and expertise. Thus the academic 
believes that the cost of implementing this practice could remove small companies and 
concentrate the market in the hands of a few larger companies. Furthermore, artisanal miners 
could be excluded as the informal nature of their trade means that they do not possess the 
capability to formally demonstrate the origins of their minerals. The academic argues this 
could provide grounds to exclude them from the supply chain, and consequently worsen the 
economic conditions under which artisanal miners live.  
 
However, these fears arise partly because MNCs in the past have ignored the principle of 
shared responsibility for implementing CoCs across the supply chain (ibid, p.71), leaving 
suppliers to bear the costs for extended social and environmental standards themselves (Kolk 
and van Tulder, 2005, p.17). This is particularly burdensome for smaller companies. CoCs all 
contain some compliance costs (Utting, 2002, p.98), and it is also expensive to verify practice 
(Bendell, 2005, p.366). The Guidance addresses these concerns by recommending that 
companies help their suppliers build their capabilities and conform to the principles set out by 
the OECD. Global brands are increasingly expected to assist their suppliers in tackling CSR 
issues (Locke and Romis, 2007, p.60), and the electronics industry have readily stated their 
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desire to do so (EICC, 2009, p.1). Further reflecting the Guidance principles, the corporate 
manager VWDWHV WKDW KLV FRPSDQ\¶V SROLF\ LV WR KHOS VXSSOLHUV GHYHORS WKHLU FDSDELOLWLHV
through contractual commitments. The academic believes this behaviour will allow for the 
transfer of MNC expertise and resources which will ensure that the costs on smaller 
enterprises will not be too burdensome.  
 
7.4 Audits 
The role of audits in verifying adherence to CoCs has been widely criticised because their 
confidential nature means that they often cannot be scrutinised by external parties such as 
NGOs (Bendell, 2005, p.367). As discussed earlier, both industry and NGOs have recognised 
that smelters are a critical link in bringing transparency to the supply chain (Prendergast and 
Lezhnev, 2009, p.6) as it is here that ores from different sources get mixed and lose their 
traceability. This has resulted in step 4 of the Guidance. This rigorous process could make 
smelWHUV ³FRPH FOHDQ´ +RZDUG  E\ VXEMHFWLQJ WKHLU VRXUFLQJ UHFRUGV WR H[WHUQDO
auditing (Prendergast and Lezhnev, 2009, p.7). This could overcome the traditional limitation 
of audit confidentiality as all members of the mineral supply chain after the smelter level 
would be involved in the audit process and have a vested interest in its output. Furthermore, 
multi-stakeholder CoCs often rely on professional audit companies for monitoring instead of 
dividing the task among different groups (Fransen and Kolk, 2007, p.679). The involvement 
of various supply chain actors in the smelter audit process means that monitoring will take 
place through various stakeholders, and this could result in a more thorough application of 
the content. The input of NGOs and civil society groups into the Guidance development 
could complement this, as these groups will be familiar with the Guidance and thus be more 
likely to scrutinise corporate practice.  
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Other aspects of the Guidance content which address concerns outlined in the literature 
include the establishment of a mechanism that allows whistleblowers to voice their concerns 
without reprisal. Workers often cannot report code violations without risking disciplinary 
action or even dismissal (Diller, 1999, p.119), and including this provision makes for a 
potentially effective grievance mechanism that will help companies better identify risk. 
Another practical concern regarding CoCs has been the tendency for codes to be launched 
with huge publicity in developed countries whilst bHLQJ ³XQNQRZQ XQDYDLODEOH RU XQ-
WUDQVODWHG DW SURGXFWLRQ IDFLOLWLHV´ ibid, p.119). However, the OECD document contains 
internal communication commitments that aim to ensure that information reaches the relevant 
employees.  
 
7.5 Sanctions 
However, within their content, it is argued that codes should contain credible sanctions for 
non-compliance (Blore and Smillie, 2010, p.5) as these often deter firms from reneging on 
their commitments (Kolk et al., 1999, p.169). Nearly two-thirds of suppliers CoCs contain 
overt sanctions for non-compliance (Fransen and Kolk, 2007, p.169). Yet it appears that the 
OECD has not included explicit references as to what the consequences should be if 
companies and their suppliers fail to comply. Resultantly, Locke et al.¶V S³RSHQ
VHFUHW´ WKDW FRPSDQLHV UDUHO\ H[LW VXSSOLHU UHODWLRQVKLSV FRXOG FRQWLQXH WR SHUVLVW ZLWKRXW
clear determination of the procedure when a supplier does not adhere to the Guidelines. This 
FRQWULEXWHVWRWKHSRWHQWLDORIXVLQJWKH*XLGDQFHDV³EOXHZDVK´8WWLQJSZKLFK
in this case means that electronics companies and suppliers could boost their image through 
their association with the Guidance without necessarily implementing them. All interviewees 
FRQFHGHG WKDW WKLVSURFHVVRI µIUHH-ULGLQJ¶ZRXOGEHDGDQJHU7KH ODFNRI VDQFWLRQV LVDOVR
heightened by the fact that the Guidance could limit the reputational risk to a small group of 
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larger and more visible companies (Millington, 2008, p.378) GXH WR *H6,¶V LQYROYHPHQW, 
further removing scrutiny from smaller and potentially non-compliant companies. 
Furthermore, Kolk et al (1999, p.163) believe that the inclusion of a time scale for changes to 
occur within codes adds to their measurability and credibility, but the academic states that he 
feels no sense of driving improvements in the OECD document. This could ultimately impact 
the thoroughness of implementation as users of the Guidelines cannot be held accountable to 
pre-stated goals or deadlines. 
 
7.6 Conclusion 
The content of the Guidance thus poses certain challenges for implementation. The desire to 
extend end-user visibility of the supply chain down to smelter level requires new 
management tools. The joint audit of smelter due diligence requires new methods of sharing 
sensitive information. Meanwhile the lack of overt reference to sanctions and exclusion of 
any clear measurable targets arguably decreases the likelihood of thorough implementation 
and compliance.  
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CHAPTER EIGHT: THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE GUIDANCE 
 
This chapter will thus examine the implementation process of the Guidance, examining the 
role of E-TASC and how it can be used by companies and suppliers, before evaluating the 
likelihood that companies will comply with the Guidance.  
 
8.1 E-TASC 
The introduction of a new CoC often requires the adoption of new management systems 
(Gordon and Miyake, 2001, p.161), and one of the policies recommended by the OECD is the 
usage of E-TASC. Particularly in areas of social and environmental impact, due diligence 
should be executed in tandem with systems that allow companies to identify potential risks 
(Taylor et al., 2009, p.3), and E-TASC allows companies to do just that. Traditionally, 
corporations are not accustomed to establishing systems for the management of non-financial 
risks (ibid, p.5), and thus encouraging the usage of E-TASC could help companies with 
implementation. 
 
Information is ³FHQWUDO´WRYROXQWDU\UHJXODWRU\ LQLWLDWLYHV VXFKDV&2&/RFNH and Romis, 
2007, p.54), and consequently E-7$6&¶V DELOLW\ WR IDFLOLWDWH WKH ³IORZ RI FULWLFDO
LQIRUPDWLRQ´ 7D\ORU HW DO  S EHWZHHQ EX\HUV DQG VXSSOLHUV LV LPSRUWDQW LQ
implementing the due diligence guidance. Through SAQs displayed through E-TASC, 
suppliers can provide current and potential associates with important information about their 
operations and also improve their understanding of what customers expect of their practices 
(UNGC, 2010, p.35), thus helping to implement the Guidance throughout supply chains. 
SAQs allows a more flexible and pragmatic approach for buyers and suppliers as they can be 
conducted in a shorter time frame and are relatively less costly than formal audits (ibid, p.35). 
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The information submitted through E-TASC does contain some third party verification which, 
as the academic remarked, is important in ensuring its quality. This accuracy of content could 
create credible commitment (Locke et al., 2009, p.324) between actors in the supply chain 
that the OECD Guidance is being widely implemented.  
 
The OECD were highly concerned that the E-TASC update should allow smelter due 
diligence practices and audits to be viewed by mineral end-users as opposed to associates 
simply one step above in the supply chain. Commercial agreements between business 
associates frequently limit the disclosure of information to end-users (EICC, 2009, p.2), and 
this has meant companies have struggled as to whether and how to include sub-tier suppliers, 
RUWKHLUVXSSOLHUV¶VXSSOLHUVLQWKHLU(6&0LQLWLDWLYHVEHFDXVHRIWKLVFRQILGHQWLDOLW\DQGODFN
of influence (UNGC, 2010, p.32).  However, Achilles¶ Panager stated that with some 
investment and alterations to the existing E-TASC system, companies will be able to view 
supplier and smelter performance without violating confidentiality agreements. The corporate 
Director said that this will allow risks further down the supply chain to percolate up through 
E-TASC to end-users, bringing greater transparency to the supply chain without disclosing 
confidential information. E-TASC thereby provides a viable mechanism through which the 
Guidance can be implemented.  
 
As mentioned previously, the Guidance lacks an overt reference to any forms of sanction 
should companies not properly implement its recommendations. However, the senior 
academic believes that the incorporation of the Guidance into E-TASC will result in an 
informal industry sanction for transgressors. Through such technology, companies are able to 
gather information about supplier sources, quality, prices (Scherer and Palazzo, 2008, p.418), 
and now social and environmental performance. E-TASC can thus help end-users avoid CSR 
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risk within the mineral supply chain as it allows them to ensure that suppliers have effective 
compliance programmes and strategies (UNGC, 2010, p.14) to meet Guidance. If it appears 
that certain suppliers are not adequately adhering to the Guidance, $FKLOOHV¶Panager stated 
that companies could simply shift their orders to those who are. Consequently, suppliers that 
transgress are sanctioned through terminated business partnerships. E-TASC thus indirectly 
allows companies to regulate supplier conduct, and resultantly allows them to select their 
business partners in accordance with OECD FRQVLGHUDWLRQV ,W DOVR UHLQIRUFHV WKH 2(&'¶V
desire for companies to help their suppliers with the implementation of the Guidance 
recommendations, as the usage of E-TASC to monitor current and potential suppliers could 
help them adapt to more stringent requirements in the long run.  
 
However, E-TASC does suffer from certain limitations, with the academic stating that within 
the electronics industry, sourcing information is inherently hard to obtain. A laptop could 
have 15 different suppliers for its components, who in turn have suppliers of their own; 
illustrating that one single product is the culmination of goods and services provided by 
potentially hundreds of sources (LaMonica, 2010). This vast number of suppliers and sub-tier 
suppliers presents monitoring difficulties (Utting, 2002, p.93). Furthermore, voluntary 
mechanisms such as SAQs for assessing enterprise performance do present risks (Diller, 1999, 
p.124), and the corporate manager asserted that reliable self-assessments depend on trust. The 
corporate Director reiterated this by admitting that the SAQs contained within E-TASC can 
misrepresent supplier practices.  Self-DVVHVVPHQWVDOVRGHSHQGRQDVXSSOLHU¶VFRPSHWHQF\WR
collect information from various parts of their enterprise (UNGC, 2010, p.35), and this is a 
difficult task as users of E-TASC are confronted with over 850 questions within the SAQ. 
$FKLOOHV¶ 'LUHctor stated that many suppliers find it difficult not only to obtain the 
information asked for in the questionnaires, whilst $FKLOOHV¶ manager said that they 
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sometimes do not understand the reasons why buyers might want it. This presents risks that 
the information provided by the questionnaires may be incomplete, inaccurate or simply 
incorrect, thus inhibiting the effective implementation of the Guidance. 
 
Underlining this emphasis on trust is the overall lack of verification of the information 
submitted provided within E-TASC. Firstly, the information provided by audits is often of 
mixed quality with monitoring tools often providing similar scores between facilities which 
in reality have very different conditions (Locke and Romis, 2007, p.55). Secondly, AchLOOHV¶
Director admitted that whilst Achilles does execute a randomised audit program of 
subscribers, it is lagging behind. Achilles have launched a Validation Protocol process in a 
bid to provide third party verification for certain aspects of supplier responses, but out of the 
850 questions in the questionnaires, attempts are being made to validate only 32 of them. 
This presents risk to companies, especially as Afrimex were prosecuted after trusting supplier 
statements about their practices without visiting a mine to determine conditions themselves 
(NCP, 2009, p.9). $FKLOOHV¶ Panager conceded that whilst audits provide the best outlet for 
validation, it is simply impossible and too costly to audit every supplier. So as $FKLOOHV¶
Director admitted, you need validation processes otherwise the information provided by E-
TASC regarding the implementation of the Guidance will go unchallenged. Unfortunately, 
Achilles is yet to establish these.  
 
8.2 Other Considerations 
Positively affecting the implementation and compliance of companies is the multi-
stakeholder approach taken to developing the Guidance. Given the intense scrutiny 
businesses are faced with regarding their mineral sourcing, such an approach facilitates the 
building of relationships between various actors and results in growing stakeholder 
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confidence (Van Tulder, 2006, p.361). This allows for greater visibility and accountability 
between companies and their stakeholders (Bondy et al., 2007, p.438), and in the long run 
this could help to keep companies in accordance with the Guidance. $FKLOOHV¶ 'LUHFWRU 
believes that NGOs will challenge corporate practice and be sceptical of their achievements 
in implementing the Guidelines. Meanwhile, the academic stated that unlike company codes, 
the involvement of non-corporate actors means that the Guidance cannot be compromised 
over individual company objections, and the working group participant reiterated this by 
stating how difficult it is IRUFRPSDQLHVWRLQIOXHQFHWKH2(&'7KLVPHDQVWKDW³PDQDJHULDO
FDSWXUH´ Amaeshi and Amao, 2009, p.233) of CSR is unlikely to occur. As the senior 
academic remarked, the multi-stakeholder approach reinforces the Guidance because the 
degree of scrutiny applied by OECD, NGOs and civil society as a result of their participation 
would make it difficult for companies to be hugely divergent, especially as the Guidance 
requires companies to publish annual reports of their due diligence practices. 
 
Furthermore, the senior member of GeSI hopes that the role of GeSI in developing and 
piloting the Guidance will influence supply chain actors from an industry perspective, leading 
to what the senior academic termed ³D OHYHO SOD\LQJ ILHOG WKDW HYHU\one DJUHHV WR´
Companies will be more willing to implement the Guidance because the industry approach 
means that they can explore CSR initiatives within a competitive commercial context 
(Pearson and Seyfang, 2001, p.66), subsequently maintaining consistency. Widespread 
industry action also stands to avert potential government legislation (Fort and Westermann-
Behaylo, 2008, p.70). The corporate Director cited this as an important reason for adopting 
industry-wide CoCs as regulation would impede creativity and increase costs.  
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However, industry-wide initiatives do face credibility issues (Bendell, 2005, p.366) which 
could potentially impact implementation and compliance, and these manifest themselves 
through the industry groups involved in the development. The senior member of GeSI states 
that GeSI membership only contains the largest electronics MNCs, meaning that a large 
proportion of the industry has not been involved in the Guidelines as yet. CoC adoption has 
tended to be mainly limited to those who are already industry leaders (Bondy et al., 2007, 
p.444), and there is a risk of this continuing to be the case. The academic also believes that 
companies have not taken action yet because minerals such as coltan are such marginal inputs 
into their products, reflecting corporate inertia to act without external stimulus.  
 
This reflects the corporate manager¶V DVVHUWLRQ WKDW WKH PDMRULW\ RI FRQVXPHU DQG 1*2
campaigns have been targeted at manufacturers of end products. As his company is not an 
end-product manufacturer, he said that they have not taken such an active role in the 
Guidance development. It follows that this could mean that those heavily involved are those 
with the greatest reputational risk and are simply DWWHPSWLQJ WR ³ZDUG RII RU PLQLPLVH WKH
GDPDJH RI FDPSDLJQV´ 9DQ 7XOGHU  S. Meanwhile, companies such as the 
corporate manager¶VDUe out of the public spotlight, meaning their compliance is unlikely to 
be heavily scrutinised, posing a threat to the overall implementation of the Guidance.  
 
8.3 Compliance Likelihood 
Kolk et al (1999, p.174) assert that compliance likelihood ± the probability that firms will 
conform in practice to codes ± of CoCs issued by international organisations tends to be low. 
7KH\ UHVXOWDQWO\ GHYHORSHG D µFRPSOLDQFH IUDPHZRUN¶ ZKLFK VWDWHV WKDW WKH OLNHOLKRRG RI
compliance is determined by:   
1. Monitoring systems and processes ± the collection of information and its verification 
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2. The position of the monitoring actor 
3. Sanctions to the firm ± consequences of non-compliance 
4. Sanctions to third parties ± used by firms that want to encourage business associates 
to comply with codes 
5. Financial commitment  
 
Applying the above discussion to the framework: 
 
1. E-TASC provides an adept system for the collection of information, as companies submit 
details of their implementation progress which can then be shared across the supply chain 
in a transparent yet confidential manner, positively impacting compliance. However, the 
V\VWHP¶V YHULILFDWLRQ SURFHVVHV lag behind, which potentially limits other factors 
determining compliance likelihood, particularly sanctions to third parties. 
 
2. Monitoring will take place from a number of different parties. Companies will monitor 
their suppliers through the use of E-TASC to determine whether recommendations have 
been implemented. They will also be scrutinising other industry members to make sure 
that their competitors are implementing the Guidance as well so that they are not at a 
competitive disadvantage. Meanwhile, NGOs and civil society organisations are likely to 
scrutinise and challenge corporate practice in order to make sure that their actions are 
indeed leading to the desired changes on the ground, providing an independent foil to the 
first party method of monitoring provided by companies themselves. The requirement of 
companies to publish annual reports on their due diligence practices should facilitate this. 
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3. The Guidelines make little reference to explicit sanctions, and thus it is unclear whether 
there exist sufficient disincentives IRUILUP¶VWREUHDNWKHLUFRPPLWPHQWWRWKH*XLGDQFH
However, as seen in the Development section, NGO and civil society groups appear to 
have triggered industry interest in utilising OECD Guidelines to address their mineral 
supply chains. This suggests that they do possess power over corporations, and should 
they exercise it, could negatively impact corporate brand and reputation. The academic 
states that public exposure is a very effective method of ensuring compliance. NGOs and 
civil society groups could viably provide this sanction.  
 
4. Companies are looking to reduce risk in their supply chains, and thus will be monitoring 
their current and potential suppliers through E-TASC. Should suppliers appear to be 
failing to implement the Guidance principles, buyers will have grounds to terminate the 
business relationship, providing a severe sanction in itself. However, the lack of effective 
YHULILFDWLRQRILQIRUPDWLRQSURYLGHGE\WKHWRROFRXOGFRPSURPLVHDEX\HU¶VDELOLW\WRGR
this.  
 
5. Kolk et al (1999, p.170) argue that a higher financial commitment to a code positively 
influences compliance. The cost of implanting the Guidance will vary for companies 
according to their size, their nature of production, and their existing management systems. 
The price of E-TASC subscription is set proportionally to turnover, and $FKLOOHV¶
manager states that E-TASC aims to be affordable to all. Furthermore, the Guidance 
includes provisions for companies to help their suppliers with implementation by 
providing resources and expertise, further decreasing the cost. It appears that extensive 
costs will not be encountered, and according to this framework, compliance likelihood 
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will be negatively impacted. Yet from a pragmatic perspective, lower costs are necessary 
in order to promote widespread industry uptake of the Guidance.  
 
8.4 Conclusion 
Ultimately, it is clear that the usage of E-TASC will help with the implementation of the 
Guidelines as it provides a conduit through which companies can influence their supply chain 
in a manner consistent with the Guidance regarding the sharing of information. The corporate 
manager argued that it develops a degree of confidence within both companies and wider 
industry as E-TASC enables them to demonstrate that they have executed credible due 
diligence. This alleviates risk within the industry supply chain as E-TASC underpins business 
relationships by providing an outlet for mutual understanding (OGP, 2004, p.3). The sharing 
of information facilitates growing transparency within an industry between buyers and 
suppliers, and this trust will potentially encourage buyers to provide greater assistance to 
suppliers (Carter and Jennings, 2002, p.46) in achieving the standards set out by the OECD. It 
may also allow companies to enforce the sanction of contract termination should supplier 
implementation be inadequate. The multi-stakeholder approach could complement this by 
generating interest from NGOs and civil society groups, who may pressure companies and 
scrutinise their practices to look for thorough compliance.  
 
However, these factors will probably not be able to ensure proper implementation and 
compliance with the Guidance. The collection of potentially incomplete and biased 
information will not improve practice (Locke et al., 2009, p.344), and thus the lack of 
verification provided by E-TASC could impact the thoroughness of implementation and 
compliance. Furthermore, the lack of formal sanction imposed on companies themselves 
presents a potential threat to implementation, particularly since the Guidelines are voluntary 
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and have been developed by large and visible companies. There is a risk of other companies 
µIUHH-ULGLQJ¶RQWKHFUHGLELOLW\JHQHUDWHGE\WKLV LQLWLDWLYHZLWKRXWQHFHVVDULO\ LPSOHPHQWLQJ
the relevant principles. Resultantly, the senior academic conceded that E-TASC only 
functions properly when all actors collaborate for good commercial reasons, and the 
corporate director argued that other steps must be taken in conjunction with E-TASC to 
ensure that the Guidance is properly implemented and complied with so that effective due 
diligence is carried out. It is subsequently unclear as to whether the due diligence practices 
outlined by the OECD are likely to become institutionalised best practice in their current 
form. 
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CHAPTER NINE: THE INSTITUTIONALISATION OF THE GUIDANCE 
 
9.1 Introduction 
Global Witness (2009, p.87) argue thaW ³WKH KLJKHVW VWDQGDUGV RI GXH GLOLJHQFH VKRXOG
EHFRPH WKH QRUP´ ZLWKLQ WKH PLQHUDO VXSSO\ FKDLQ DQG WKLV UHIOHFWV D GHVLUH WR VHH GXH
diligence become an institutionalised practice. The process of institutionalisation is when 
³VRFLDO SURFHVVHV REOLJDWLons, or actualities come to take on a rule like status in social 
WKRXJKW DQG DFWLRQ´ 0H\HU DQG 5RZDQ  S PHDQLQJ WKDW FRPSDQLHV ZRXOG
execute mineral due diligence ³ZLWKRXWUHTXLULQJHLWKHUUHSHDWHGDXWKRULWDWLYHLQWHUYHQWLRQRU
collective mobilisation´ %DWWLODQD DQG '¶$XQQR  S The following chapter will 
draw on previous analysis to determine the scope for the OECD Guidance becoming 
institutionalised practice, the factors currently limiting this process, and whether there are any 
potential sources of external impetus which could lead to widespread implementation and 
dispersal.  
 
9.2 Industry Standardisation 
)LUVWO\ ³&65 LV RIWHQ GULYHQ E\ VWDQGDUGLVDWLRQ´ 9LVVHU  S as suppliers can be 
confronted with a plethora of codes from MNCs catering to similar aspects of conduct (ILO, 
2003). The release of the OECD Guidance represents an attempt to standardise the due 
diligence electronics companies carry out regarding their mineral sourcing. Some DUJXHIRU³D
set of universal CSR standards in order to secure the necessary credibility and legitimacy for 
&65 WR EH VXFFHVVIXO´ %RQG\  S DQG LPSOHPHQWLQJ WKH *XLGDQFH UHSUHVHQWV D
credible CSR commitment from firms that stands to be recognised by other industry actors, 
giving greater potential for it to become institutionalised practice. The institutionalisation 
process often involves a legitimating organisation maintaining an institutional practice by 
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bestowing legitimacy on other actors (Trank and Washington, 2009, p.236), and in this case 
this role is being carried out by the OECD. All interviewees acknowledged the legitimacy the 
OECD possess in setting international standards, and by encouraging companies to utilise the 
Guidance, the OECD are conferring their legitimacy upon those who implement their 
recommended practices. Thus the chance of due diligence becoming institutionalised is that 
much stronger.  
 
Institutional theory also posits that a strong determinant of behDYLRXUZLWKLQDILHOGLVDFWRUV¶
need to be regarded as lHJLWLPDWH ZLWKLQ WKHLU HQYLURQPHQW %DWWLODQD DQG '¶$XQno, 2009, 
p31), and thus the focus of the Guidance on the electronics industry could meaningfully 
contribute to this process. The academic remarked how the Guidance presents a fantastic 
opportunity for companies to demonstrate that they are succeeding in meeting internationally 
accepted standards. Accordingly, sector-wide implementation will help to maintain a level 
playing field between companies, which ensures that no one is at a disadvantage for pursuing 
OECD compliance (Global Witness, 2009, p.87). The involvement of GeSI in the 
development of the Guidance is also complemented by the stated support of the EICC, 
meaning that there are viable industry outlets through which implementation can be 
encouraged. As a result of industry association participation in developing and dispersing the 
Guidance, they also act as legitimating agents. Thus they can contribute to the 
institutionalisation of the Guidance by their ability to sanction company participation in the 
industry should a company fail to comply, or by the granting of access to additional resources 
should they comply (Trank and Washington, 2009, p.236). This could be complemented by 
the tendency for smaller companies to follow practices pioneered by large companies such as 
WKRVHLQ*H6,DQGWKH(,&&LQRUGHUWR³OHJLWLPLVHWKHPVHOYHV´.RONDQGYDQ7XOGHU
p.21). 6XEVHTXHQWO\ RYHU WLPH GXH GLOLJHQFH FRXOG ³EHFRPH LQIXVHG ZLWK QRUPDWLYH
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DVVRFLDWLRQV´ DQG EHFRPH D SUDFWLFH ³WKDW RUJDQLVDWLRQV DGRpt in order to gain or maintain 
OHJLWLPDF\´+LUVKDQG%LUPLVVS 
 
Underpinning this standardisation and potential sector-wide implementation is the provision 
for the usage of E-7$6&DQGWKHV\VWHP¶VDELOLW\WRHYROYHDV certain requirements change. 
The corporate manager asserted that E-TASC is a very credible industry solution for the 
analysis of supply chain data, and the senior academic emphasises the importance for 
Achilles of bringing E-TASC into line with the OECD Guidance. Both the corporate manager 
and senior academic argued that E-TASC is already widely used and stands to gain more 
credibility if it is aligned with the OECD Guidance. $FKLOOHV¶'LUHFWRU expressed $FKLOOHV¶
commitment to maintain E-TASC as a system harmonised with international standards. Once 
D SUDFWLFH EHFRPHV HVWDEOLVKHG ³WKHUH LV DQ LQH[RUDEOH SXVK WRZDUGV KRPRJHQLVDWLRQ´
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983, p.148), and there appears to a growing feeling within the 
electronics sector that E-TASC is a viable industry solution for supply chain management. It 
also enables mineral end-users to act as legitimating agents, as if they find that suppliers are 
not complying with the Guidance, they can sanction them through terminated business 
contracts or reward compliance with purchases. This mechanism and E-7$6&¶V LPSHQGLQJ
update according to the Guidelines could encourage wider use of the system, thus 
institutionalising E-TASC and the Guidance principles it has incorporated within the 
electronics sector.  
 
9.3 Flexibility 
The pragmatic attribute of flexibility that codes possess (Bondy et al., 2007, p.447) would 
potentially help to further inform the content, implementation, and subsequent 
institutionalisation of the Guidance. The corporate Director argued that governance systems 
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should not stifle creativity as one shoe does not fit all, and the ability of CoCs to be updated 
and changed enables companies to utilise in a practical manner whilst facilitating their 
evolution. This is reflected by the pilot process the Guidance will undergo in 2011, where a 
few companies will implement the Guidance and provide feedback in order for the Guidance 
to be updated and re-issued a year later.  Multi-VWDNHKROGHU LQLWLDWLYHVDUH³G\QDPLFQHYHU-
ending, processes as codes will continuously be drawn and redrawn on the basis of social 
EDUJDLQLQJ´ .RON DQG YDQ 7XOGHU  S 7KURXJK WKLV DSSURDFK WR GHYHORSPHQW
relationships and avenues have been developed for various actors to share their experiences 
and provide input that accounts for the practical considerations of different stakeholders. The 
content of the Guidelines can thus be updated according to inevitable changes in 
circumstances, and further implementation can then take place. The Guidance thus possesses 
long term potential in addressing mineral sourcing, and subsequently companies will be more 
encouraged to adopt them.  
 
9.4 Limitations 
However, a characteristic of many multi-stakeholder initiatives such as the Guidance is their 
application to one specific sector (Utting, 2002, p.82), and this affects their ability to 
institutionalise practice and make a tangible difference on the ground. The senior member of 
GeSI conceded that it will take supply chain transparency across all industries to stop 
minerals from funding conflict, and thus widespread implementation of the Guidance within 
the electronics sector will not necessarily lead to overall changes in mining conditions in the 
DRC. Using the example of tin, any item that has a solder connection contains tin; therefore 
there still remains a huge risk that materials will continue to be sourced from conflict mines 
for non-electronic products. This could deter companies from implementing the Guidance 
due to the lack of visible improvements in the DRC itself. Furthermore, the corporate 
82 
 
manager highlighted that whilst there is scope for E-TASC to expand into other sectors, E-
TASC is only focused on the electronics industry. There is potential for the electronics 
industry to take the lead and subsequently pressure other industries (LaMonica, 2010), but the 
absence of any formal governance mechanisms and public scrutiny on other industries makes 
this uncertain.  
 
9.5 Legislation 
 
Yet part of the institutionalisation process may include support by the force of law (Meyer 
and Rowan, 2009, p.341), and this appears to be a critical factor in determining the extent to 
which the Guidance is adopted by players in the electronics industry. The Kimberley Process 
IRUGLDPRQGV LVDQH[DPSOHZKHUH LQGXVWU\ ³VHOI SROLFLQJ´VLPLODU WR WKDWDGYRFDWHGE\ WKH
OECD Guidance has led to inadequate outcomes (Enough, 2009, p.10), and consequently the 
academic remarks that there is a real appetite within the international community to move 
towards a legislative compliance mechanism to ensure mineral due diligence is carried out. 
This is further underlined by Enough (2009, p.11) calling on governments to reinforce supply 
chain practice through the introduction of sanctions and legislation that enforces audits and 
due diligence. The recent USA bill requires electronics companies to disclose what measures 
they are taking to ensure that their products are free of conflict minerals, but have not yet 
proposed any formal punishment (Sheridan, 2010). Regardless, the senior member of GeSI 
cited this development as a major incentive for companies to adopt the Guidance, as if 
governments choose to use the OECD document as a basis for legislation, companies will be 
at a competitive disadvantage having not initially implemented its principles. The academic 
also anticipates that supply chain monitoring will become a legislative norm in the EU not 
just in the electronics industry, and thus adopting systems now to ensure that adequate due 
diligence is executed is preferable for the long run.  
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9.6 Conclusion 
Fort and Westermann-Behaylo (2008, p.63) identify three different types of trust present in 
the business-society relationship:  
 
x ³+DUG7UXVW± relating to coercive actions such as government legislation 
x Real Trust ± relating to business efficacy where the business case for engaging in 
socially responsible behaviour is made, and 
x Good trust ± WKHDHVWKHWLFTXHVWIRUKLJKHUJRRGWKURXJKHWKLFDOEXVLQHVVEHKDYLRXU´ 
 
&XUUHQWO\LWDSSHDUVWKDWµUHDOWUXVW¶ LVSUHVHQWDVFRUSRUDWHPHPEHUVKDYHWRXFKHGXSRQWKH
brand and reputational risk the conflict issue poses to their companies and acknowledged the 
role NGO and civil society campaigns have played in inducing them to act, lessening the 
FKDQFHWKDWµJRRGWUXVW¶LVLQH[LVWHQFH+RZHYHUWKHPRYHWRZDUGVDQGGHVLUHWRVHHJUHDWHU
levels of formal legislation governing corporate behaviour in this area underlines a move 
WRZDUGVµ+DUG7UXVW¶RIEXVLQHVVHVDVFRHUFLYHDFWLRQVDUHEHLQJWDNHQWKURXJKJRYHUQPHQW
regulation (ibid, p.63) to influence company practice.  There is every possibility that this 
legislation could be extended beyond the electronics industry, offering a long-term outlet for 
overcoming the limitation of the Guidance solely concentrating on one industry. Should this 
occur, due diligence regarding the sourcing of minerals could become widespread, resulting 
in the principles advocated by the Guidance becoming institutionalised practice. Perhaps only 
then will its effects be fully felt on the ground in the DRC. 
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CHAPTER TEN: CONCLUSION 
 
This dissertation has provided an in-depth case study of an international CSR code of conduct, 
examining the wider literature to provide the context within which conflict minerals has 
emerged as a CSR issue for companies. It has operationalised theory to illustrate a multi-
stakeholder development pURFHVVDQGKRZWKLVZLOOSRWHQWLDOO\FRQWULEXWHWR WKH*XLGDQFH¶V
overall efficacy. Working closely with the Guidance through an internship allowed for an 
analysis of its content, underlining how it addresses problems in the mineral supply chain and 
how it overcomes limitations traditionally associated with CoCs expressed in the literature. 
Meanwhile, the internship also allowed for a greater understanding of how management tools 
such as E-TASC can align with and complement such Guidance. This formed the basis for 
analysing the process of implementing and monitoring the Guidance, and whether this is 
likely to result in compliance. Finally, institutional theory was utilised to examine the 
potential of the Guidance becoming industry best practice and contributing to tangible change 
on the ground in the DRC.  
 
To summarise, MNCs are currently facing widespread criticism for their implicit contribution 
to the '5&¶V conflict through their potential usage of conflict minerals in global supply 
chains. As globalisatiRQ KDV OHG WR ³WKH QHHG WRFRQVLGHU QHZ IRUPV RI SROLWLFDO UHJXODWLRQ
above and beyond the nation-VWDWH´ 6FKHUHU DQG 3DOD]]R  S FRUSRUDWLRQV DUH
increasingly being encouraged to self-regulate. NGOs and civil society have subsequently 
called on businesses to play their part in bringing transparency to the mineral supply chain 
(Global Witness, 2009, p.87). As self-regulation is no longer solely carried out by companies 
themselves (Scherer et al, 2006, p.522), there has been a rise in multi-stakeholder CoCs 
which allow external organisations to influence the behaviour of corporations (Bondy et al, 
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2007, p.443). The OECD Guidance is thus a CoC that aims to address the issue of conflict 
minerals.  
 
The multi-stakeholder development process of the GuidDQFHUHIOHFWHG0LWFKHOOHWDO¶V
stakeholder salience model, as only definitive stakeholders that possessed all three attributes 
power, legitimacy, and urgency pertaining to corporations and the conflict mineral issue were 
extensively consulted. This process informed the content of the Guidance, which recognised 
the latent power of end-users in influencing other supply chain actors by encouraging them to 
make standards contractual with their suppliers. By compelling end-users to help their 
suppliers with implementation, the Guidance could potentially overcome the danger of 
squeezing out small to medium-size companies from the supply chain due to the costs of 
implementing a CoC, traditionally a major limitation. The notable absence of miners in the 
consultation process is reflected by the Guidance only tackling the supply chain to smelter 
level. However, the Guidance does not contain any explicit sanctions for those who claim to 
adhere to but do not properly apply it.  
 
This presents challenges for Guidance implementation. The usage of E-TASC will aid this 
process as it facilitates the transfer of information between supply chain actors, allows 
companies to monitor their suppliers for compliance, and potentially provides an informal 
industry sanction through terminated business contracts with non-compliant companies. 
However, E-TASC is unable to provide thorough verification of information and the 
Guidance lacks a formal punishment of transgressors $FFRUGLQJ WR .RON HW DO¶V 
compliance framework, these issues will potentially negatively impact the compliance of 
companies and consequently the institutionalisation of the Guidance as well. 
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+RZHYHULQVWLWXWLRQDOLVHGSUDFWLFHV³RIWHQHQWHULQWRVRFLDOOLIHSULPDULO\DVIDFWVZKLFKPXVW
be taken into acFRXQW E\ DFWRUV´ 0H\HU DQG 5RZDQ  S DQG conflict mineral 
LQLWLDWLYHV VKRXOG ³FRPSOHPHQW D SROLWLFDO VWUDWHJ\´ (QRXJK  S 7hus the US 
legislation mandating electronics companies to disclose the steps they are taking to avoid 
purchasing conflict minerals GLVSOD\V ³KDUG WUXVW´ )RUW DQG :HVWHUPDQQ-Behaylo, 2008, 
p.63) of companies and a major step towards the institutionalisation of the Guidance. The 
academic believes this could lead to similar domestic legislation in most OECD countries, 
and this would overcome the lack of explicit sanction through simple force of law.  
 
Figure 5: Revised Conceptual Framework 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Subsequently, whilst the uptake of the Guidance was originally characterised as a vertical 
linear relationship in Figure 1, Figure 5 shows how the multi-stakeholder development and 
potential institutionalisation will allow the relationships between the different stages to 
become more dynamic, fluid, and interrelating. Government legislation mandating companies 
to disclose their due diligence steps will potentially direct more corporations to the Guidance 
as a CoC for demonstration. This will impact implementation as more companies will aim to 
adhere to the Guidance with increased compliance likelihood due to government involvement. 
The institutionalisation process could also impact future developments and revisions of the 
Institutionalisation 
Content 
Development 
Implementation 
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Guidance, as the flexibility of multi-stakeholder CoCs could facilitate a learning process 
through the interactions and experiences of various stakeholders involved (Bendell, 2005, 
p.363).  This will allow content to be updated, and as legislation stands to extend to industries 
beyond purely electronics, the updated content could subsequently contribute to wider 
implementation and institutionalisation across a range of sectors.  
 
$V WKH*XLGDQFH LVRQO\VWLOO LQGUDIW IRUPDQG$FKLOOHV¶ LQYROYHPHQW LV \HW WREH ILQDOLVHG
further research on the Guidance in its finalised form and after its pilot phase could provide a 
richer and more accurate account of the ideas explored in this dissertation. As expressed 
earlier, a major gap in research materials was the lack of access to OECD interviewees. 
Interviews with OECD participants and access to the Guidance working group would provide 
deeper insights into the multi-stakeholder development process. This would be particularly 
interesting within the context of making updates and revisions to the Guidance, and could 
permit a study of the processes outlined in Figure 5 and whether they indeed transpire.  
Additionally, little work has been done on how CoCs evolve with their institutional context 
(Amaeshi and Amao, 2009, p.236), and thus further research could again WDNH )LJXUH ¶V
revised conceptual framework further by following the Guidance and seeing how it may be 
influenced by the US legislation and any others that stand to emerge in the next few years. 
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